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INTRODUCTION

Biopharmaceutical companies submit vast amounts of clinical data and
analysis to support approval of their medicines, expecting the information to be
kept confidential, as has been the practice of regulators around the world for
decades. Over the last ten years, however, pressure has been mounting for
regulators or industry to release this data. Indeed, European authorities are
moving swiftly now towards full release over industry objections and despite
several lawsuits. Industry generally argues that the material is intellectual
property-specifically trade secret or confidential commercial informationand that its release will help a company's competitors, devaluing the property
and reducing incentives for medical innovation. To the limited extent that they
have addressed the issue, however, legal scholars have generally taken the view
that no relevant doctrines or bodies of law preclude the release of this material
and that public policy considerations compel its release. And the tide is turning,
with incremental changes in the law in the United States, coercive pressure
from medical journals to release data as a condition of publication, European
regulators pressing forward, and industry volunteerism to stave off the most
aggressive forced disclosure proposals.
This Article provides a new framework for assessing disclosure of the
contents of drug applications, by filling several major gaps in the legal
scholarship. The key gaps are as follows. First, scholars in the intellectual
property field devote very little attention to this sort of information good-both
the actual content and the context in which it is generated and used. Application
of the trade secret label, in particular, has not been subjected to close scrutiny.
Second, very few have explored the special issues presented by operation in an
environment where data and analyses are generated and submitted to
government in order to gain market access-i.e., where the content has both an
informational value and a regulatory value. Third, very few have explored the
implications of operation in a multi-national environment where the decision
of one regulatory authority to release the material could have profound
implications on legal outcomes in other jurisdictions.
My primary thesis is that this content should be understood as property
rather than trade secret and that the right to exclude includes severable substrands. The right to prevent disclosure can be severed from the right to prevent
use, including use by regulators to assist one's competitors. This approach
blunts the impact in the United States of potential disclosure by European
authorities. Although this Article focuses on information submitted by
biopharmaceutical companies for approval to market their medicines, my
analysis has broader implications. Participants in many other industry sectors
submit testing analyses to regulatory authorities around the world to satisfy a
barrier to entry and with an expectation of confidentiality.
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Section I of this Article explains the relevant features of the safety and
effectiveness information in drug applications. Specifically, this content
includes raw data (including manipulated and synthesized data) and strategic
and interpretive writing. Scholars have not fully identified the potential
regulatory uses of the former if released, nor have they fully appreciated the
policy implications of releasing the latter. Section I also explains the salient
features of the barrier to market entry, including the difference in scope, cost,
and risk between innovative applications and follow-on (generic or biosimilar)
applications, and the fact that essentially the same content is submitted to
regulators around the world.
Section II provides a framework for assessing government disclosure of the
content. It argues, first, that labeling this content as trade secret is analytically
problematic. Both historically and doctrinally trade secret law is private lawmostly about actions taken in connection with relationships between private
parties, not a person and the government. Moreover, the enduring debate in
trade secret law, whether this law's origins lie in principles of property or
principles of unfair competition, arguably collapses in the regulatory context.
It makes no sense to consider whether the doctrine is property-based or liabilitybased, because the government may in fact "take and pay" with respect to
property. All roads lead to the property question. For both reasons, I propose
that we ignore the trade secret label when considering the disclosure issue. I
consider instead whether the contents of marketing applications are property.
This Section of the Article works primarily from Lockean principles, but
considers also utilitarian norms.
After concluding that the contents are property, I turn to characterizing the
sticks in the bundle of rights. This is where a deeper understanding of the
content and its context are most relevant. This content has both informational
uses and regulatory uses, to its owner and to potential third parties. These
qualitatively different uses for the content lead to a broader right to exclude
than scholars and courts have previously asserted, including severable rights to
prevent disclosure and to prevent use. Thus, disclosure need not deprive the
owner of the right to disallow direct use-including, for instance, reliance on a
company's information by regulators for the benefit of the company's
competitors.
This conclusion represents a significant departure from
conventional wisdom about trade secrets (that disclosure eviscerates the
property right) and helps to demonstrate why the trade secret label is wrong. A
robust reading of the right to exclude, combined with an understanding of the
full regulatory context, also helps to explain why this content should not be
viewed as a true public good. Among other things, released clinical modules
might be excludable, insofar as a regulator can decline (or be forbidden) to use
them in support of third party products.
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Understanding this content as property leads to the conclusion that in the
United States, takings law applies. The leading case with respect to data
submitted for regulatory purposes, Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, suggests that
disclosure is a taking, but it suffers from a serious analytical flaw; Justice
Blackmun commented that disclosure of the data eviscerated the property
interest. 1 The balance of the Court's property takings jurisprudence would lead
to a similar conclusion, although Kaiser Aetna and Mahon remain the most
compelling precedents, particularly because disclosure to the public at large
would eliminate the information owner's ability to profit from the fruits of its
labor.2 But, because the right to exclude can be understood more broadly than
Justice Blackmun asserted, disclosure should not be understood to have
eviscerated all property right in the material. This could have profound
implications in the United States, where, for instance, an argument has been
made that biologic applications filed prior to the enactment of the new
biosimilars law contain property that cannot be used over the owner's objection
to support biosimilars. The framework presented in this Article should lead to
the conclusion that disclosure of the content by European authorities has no
bearing on that use-related takings claim.
I also argue in Section II that public policy considerations should shape the
taking and ancillary legal reforms. The most compelling argument for
disclosure of the contents of applications is that the information could be used
by others in ways that would advance the public health (for instance,
aggregation and meta-analyses) and that industry either cannot do this work or
lacks the incentive to do it. The most compelling argument against broad
disclosure, however, is that the information can be used by competitors to
support their own commercial programs, immediately harming the application
holder. The public policy arguments together point to controlled sharing with
non-profit researchers to advance general scientific knowledge, including our
understanding of approved medicines. In view of the takings issue, however,
the government should consider incentivizing or rewarding volunteerism. If
instead a taking is considered, then compensation must be provided, though it
could perhaps be accomplished through statutory "in kind" mechanisms. The
risk that another regulator will move first, eliminating a takings claim, may also
call for consideration of reforms that will blunt the impact of disclosure on
incentives to innovate.

1. 467 U.S. 986 (1984).
2. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979); Pennsylvania Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S.
393 (1922).

40

MARQ. INTELL. PROP.L. REV.

[Vol. 18:1

I. BACKGROUND
This Article provides a legal framework for assessing whether medicine
regulators should release to the public the safety and effectiveness information
generated and submitted by private companies in applications for permission to
market their medicines. Proponents of release generally characterize release as
furthering "transparency" with respect to the evidentiary basis for government
decisions, and they invoke a general policy preference for government "in the
sunshine"-as embodied, for example, in the U.S. Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). 3 This Article refers instead to "disclosure" and "release" of the
information in question, in large part because the term "transparency" conveys
judgment about the appropriate public policy. The term is also overbroad,
covering everything from disclosure of internal agency procedures to disclosure
of government employee addresses.
Under most modem regulatory schemes, a company wishing to market a
new medicine must obtain approval to do so, from the government, prior to
launch. In the United States, new drugs require new drug applications (NDAs)
approved under section 505 of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
(FDCA). Biological products require licenses issued under section 351 of the
Public Health Service Act (PHSA). FDA may approve an NDA only if the
application demonstrates that the drug is safe and effective for use under the
conditions described in the proposed labeling and, in particular, that there is
"substantial evidence" of efficacy.4 Substantial evidence means "evidence
consisting of adequate and well-controlled investigations, including clinical
investigations . . . ."

The traditional approach involves three sequential,

sometimes overlapping, phases of trials in human subjects. 6 The third phase

3. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
4. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). The original FDCA required only that new drugs be safe and imposed
a premarket notification requirement on new drug sponsors. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act,
Pub. L. No. 75-717, ch. 675, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938). Congress added the effectiveness standard and
premarket approval requirements in 1962. Drug Amendments of 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-781, 76 Stat.
780 (1962). The 1962 amendments are generally understood as having launched the modem and
increasingly expensive and lengthy drug research and approval process. See Anna B. Laakmann,
Collapsingthe DistinctionBetween Experimentation and Treatment in the Regulation ofNew Drugs,
62 ALA. L. REV. 305, 308 (2011) ("The modem U.S. drug regulatory system was born in 1962 with
passage of the Kefauver-Harris Amendments [to the FDCA]."); Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture
of Government Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REv. 1753, 1790 (1996) ("The 1962
requirements for proof of effectiveness and affirmative FDA approval were destined to increase the
cost and time required to introduce new drugs. More extensive clinical testing would be required, and
the interest on development expenses would rise with the additional time required to convince the
agency to approve an NDA.").
5. 21 U.S.C. § 355(d) (2006).
6. 21 C.F.R. § 312.21 (2013). Generally speaking, in Phase I trials, a drug is given to a small
number of test subjects, normally healthy volunteers, in order to determine the metabolism and
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provides the substantial evidence of effectiveness. Section 351 of the PHSA
requires proof of safety, purity, and potency, and it does not mention
Nevertheless, since obtaining jurisdiction over
"substantial evidence."
biologics in 1972, FDA has interpreted "potent" to require proof of efficacy.
The agency also requires biologics applicants to submit substantial evidence of
effectiveness.
An original application for a new molecular entity today typically includes
the results of dozens of non-clinical studies and clinical trials. 9 Raw data from
clinical trials consist in the purest form of subject-specific case report forms
(CRFs), on which all information relevant to the clinical trial is recordedincluding demographic information and all relevant measurements (laboratory
results relevant to outcome measures, for instance). Demographic information
and measurements reflect the clinical trial protocol, itself the subject of
discussion and negotiation with regulators, and through that protocol, the
company's business strategy. Original CRFs are, however, not usually
submitted to regulatory agencies. Under FDA regulations, for example, CRFs
are required only where the subject dropped out or died during the study. Data
tabulations are required for the remaining subjects.'o These datasets are
submitted electronically, conforming to FDA specifications for submission of
clinical study datasets in electronic format. 1 The agency expects that the
pharmacologic actions of the drug in humans, to learn the side effects associated with increasing doses,
and to gain early evidence of effectiveness. Phase 11investigations involve up to several hundred
patients with the disease or condition being studied. They are designed to begin to assess the drug's
effectiveness. They are typically well-controlled and well-monitored. They are also intended to
determine short-term side effects and to confirm and refine early data on optimal dosage. Phase III
trials collect the pivotal safety and effectiveness data necessary for regulatory approval of the drug.
They can involve several thousand patients and frequently take place in multiple locations throughout
the country and abroad.
7. See, e.g., 46 Fed. Reg. 4634, 4637 (proposed Jan. 16, 1981) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R.
pt.601); 37 Fed. Reg. 16679, 16679 (proposed Aug. 18, 1972) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 273).
8. See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 201.57(c)(2)(iii) (2013). FDA notes that applying the substantial
evidence standard to biologics presents "unique problems" in some cases. 37 Fed. Reg. at 16679.
Thus, the requirement for data from adequate and well-controlled investigations (or one such
investigation with confirmatory evidence) is a default, but not an absolute requirement. 21 C.F.R. §
601.25(d)(2) (2013). An applicant may obtain a waiver by showing that: (1) the standard is "not
reasonably applicable" to the product or "essential to the validity of the investigation" and (2) an
"alternative method" for substantiating effectiveness is available and adequate. Id.
9. According to one report, the average number of clinical studies submitted in an NDA
between 1977 and 1980 was thirty. By 1994 and 1995, that figure had more than doubled to sixtyeight studies. Barbara Ann Binzak, How PharmacogenomicsWill Impact the Federal Regulation of
ClinicalTrials and the New DrugApproval Process, 58 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 103,112 n.57 (2003) ("The
average number of clinical trials per new drug application has increased dramatically, from 30 during
the period of 1977-1980 to 68 during 1994-1995.").
10. 50 Fed. Reg. 7452, 7453 (Feb. 22, 1985).
11. FDA, STUDY DATA SPECIFICATIONS (1.5 ver., 2009), available at http://www.fda.gov/
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applicant will discuss with the review division the datasets that will be
provided. Thus, even the tabulated datasets reflect discussions between the
applicant and the regulator and could signal the applicant's business strategy.
The applicant includes a clinical study report (CSR) for each study. In this,
the data is excerpted, organized, manipulated, and presented in tables, graphs,
and other forms that are helpful to explaining or presenting the trial or some
aspect of the trial. This document also presents the company's conclusions and
addresses possible follow-ups. In essence, it explains the study: how it was
designed and why it was designed that way; how it was performed, including
changes and surprises along the way (such as protocol deviations and
amendments and patients dropping out); the results as to every endpoint; and
statistical analysis and interpretation of the results pursuant to the data analysis
plan. A CSR is interpretive and nuanced, and it reflects the company's
judgments as to the information the regulator will consider most important and
which data are key. The study report inherently conveys information about
how the company manages its clinical development programs, such as its
relationship with clinical research organizations and monitors. There may be
extensive information about the company's meetings with and commitments to
regulators, as well as conclusions based on those meetings. There may be
descriptions of the status of ongoing or planned studies and the dates of
protocols, amendments, and other regulatory submissions.
The cost to the average company of generating this content is difficult to
quantify, and there is disagreement regarding what one should measure in the
first instance and how one should quantify time, lost opportunities, and failed
molecules. Estimates vary, but no one doubts that the cost is substantial.12
Notwithstanding the enormous investment that first entrants must make to bring
their new medicines to market, second entrants are permitted to piggy-back on
this investment, so as to climb over the barrier to entry with their copycat
products without making a similar investment of their own.13 Statutory
exclusivity periods prevent-for a time-submission or approval of these

downloads/ForIndustry/DataStandards/StudyDataStandards/UCM I99599.pdf.
12. See generally Christopher P. Adams & Van V. Brantner, Estimating The Cost OfNew Drug
Development: Is It Really $802 Million?, 25 HEALTH AFFAIRS 420 (2006). Adams and Brantner

review a widely cited figure of $802 million per new drug (in 2000 dollars) for drugs entering human
clinical trials for the first time between 1989 and 2002 and provide their own estimates, which vary
from around $500 million to more than $2 billion, depending on the drug and the company. The $802
million figure appears in Joseph A. DiMasi, Ronald W. Hansen & Henry G. Grabowski, The Price of
Innovation: New Estimates ofDrug Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151 (2003).

13. There are three possibilities: an abbreviated new drug application (ANDA), 21 U.S.C. §
355(j), a 505(b)(2) application, id. at § 355(b)(2), and a biosimilar biological product application, 42
U.S.C. § 262(k) (Supp. IV 2010).
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abbreviated applications.14 These exclusivity periods are known as data
exclusivity, because when they expire, the second entrants rely indirectly on
the data in the pioneer application demonstrating that the molecule and product
were safe and effective.'s
FDA regulations prevent the release of non-public safety and effectiveness
data and information submitted in an approved NDA unless and until one of six
events has occurred; and even in those cases, regulations preclude release if
extraordinary circumstances are shown.' 6 FDA applies the extraordinary
circumstances exception where the data and information retain competitive
value, including overseas, so as a practical matter it does not release the content
in question.' 7 The agency's regulation with respect to biologics license
applications (BLAs) is drafted differently but achieves the same result.' 8 The
current regulations date to the 1970s, but the agency's non-disclosure policy

14. If no active moiety in a product subject to an NDA has previously been approved, an ANDA
or 505(b)(2) application may ordinarily not be submitted for five years. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(F)(ii).
This period is shortened to four years if the follow-on applicant challenges a patent claiming the drug
or a method of using the drug, but then there is a 30-month stay of approval if the NDA holder or
patent owner brings timely suit. Id. at § 355(j)(5)(B)(ii). If the pioneer product contains a previously
approved active moiety, there is no bar on submission of a follow-on application, but FDA may not
approve the application for three years (assuming the pioneer application included clinical data
essential to its approval). See id. § 355(j)(5)(F)(iii); 21 C.F.R. § 314.108. A biosimilar application
may not be submitted until four years after first licensure of a pioneer product, and it may not be
approved until twelve years after first licensure. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7).
15. See Letter from Janet Woodcock, M.D., Director, CDER, to Katherine M. Sanzo, Esq. and
Lawrence S. Ganslaw, Esq., Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, LLP; Jeffrey B. Chasnow, Esq., Pfizer;
Stephan E. Lawton, Esq. and Gillian R. Woollett, Ph.D., BIO; and William R. Rakoczy, Esq., Lord,
Bissell & Brook LLP, 10 n. 14 (Oct. 14, 2003) (on file with author) ("[Rieliance on an FDA finding
of safety and effectiveness for an NDA is certainly indirect reliance on the data submitted in the
original NDA .... ); Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm. Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 2003)
(indicating that the ANDA allows the applicant "to piggyback on the safety and efficacy studies
conducted for the pioneer drug . . . .").
16. These events include that the application was found not approvable (and all legal appeals
exhausted), and that an abbreviated application under the generic drug provisions has been (or could
be, as a legal matter) approved. 21 C.F.R. § 314.430(f) (2013).
17. 39 Fed. Reg. 44602, 44613 (Dec. 24, 1974) (clarifying that "extraordinary circumstances"
include situations in which the information in question retained competitive value); see also 130 Cong.
Rec. 24977 (Sept. 12, 1984) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("Under current practice ... extraordinary
circumstances are present for example when the information is trade secret or confidential commercial
or financial information."); id at 24978 (statement of Sen. DeConcini) (quoting Commissioner of Food
and Drugs that this approach "reflects FDA's current interpretation of the term 'extraordinary
circumstances' as it now appears in the regulations.").
18. 21 C.F.R. §601.51(e) provides that, after FDA approves a BLA, all safety and effectiveness
data and information in the file "are immediately available for public disclosure unless extraordinary
circumstances are shown." The agency does not, in fact, release the premarket safety and effectiveness
information, because the information retains competitive value. See generally FEDERAL DRUG
ADMINISTRATION, 2004P- 1071 C7, LETTER OF ROBERT A. LONG, JR. (July 13, 2005).
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dates to enactment of the FDCA in 1938.19
In response to President Obama's government-wide initiative to promote
greater transparency in federal agencies, however, FDA convened a
Transparency Task Force that ultimately suggested convening a panel to
consider disclosure of safety and effectiveness data in applications. 20 The
report focused on regulatory policy, however, and eschewed legal issues. After
Deputy Commissioner Sharfstein left the agency in early 2011, the work of the
task force was laid aside. More recently, the agency has solicited comment on
possibly releasing safety and effectiveness data that have been masked as to
product identity.21
The Europeans, however, have taken concrete steps towards release of the
safety and efficacy information. In early 2012, the European Medicines
Agency (EMA) published a guidance document on implementation of the
Transparency Regulation (the equivalent of our FOIA) with respect to
marketing authorization applications.22 This guidance states that, following
product approval, the EMA may release the full non-clinical and clinical data
package in an application. This guidance represented the culmination of a
process that had begun in 2010, when-following an Ombudsman
recommendation relating to release of data to scientific researchers-the EMA
19.

See Drug Listing Act, 1971: Hearingon S. 2167 and H.R. 9936 Before the Comm. on Labor

& Pub. Welfare, 92d Cong. 46 (1971) (letter submitted by Peter Barton Hutt, Assistant Gen. Counsel,
Food, Drugs & Envtl. Health Div.) ("Since 1938, the Food and Drug Administration has interpreted
[various applicable laws] to protect from public disclosure, as confidential,. . . safety and effectiveness
data, and other similar information submitted to the FDA by the regulated industries. This has broadly
been the practice of other Government agencies."). From time to time, agency officials have supported
federal legislation permitting a different approach. E.g., Business Record Exemption of the Freedom
of InjormationAct: Hearings Before the Gov't Info. & IndividualRights Subcomm. of the H. Comm.

on Gov't Operations,95th Cong. 87 (1977) (statement of Dr. Donald Kennedy, Comm'r, FDA) ("We
are on record for such a long time and so consistency as regarding safety and efficacy data as being in
that zone and the industry has come to rely on it. There is such a long list of precedents that we really
think we need statutory help with changing that."); see also Freedom of Information Act: Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Admin. Practice& Procedureof the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,95th Cong.

6 (1977) (statement of Sherwin Gardner, Deputy Comm'r, Food and Drug Admin.) ("Legal constraints
rather than agency policy choice has largely dictated FDA's policies and practices with respect to
release of safety and efficacy data.").
20.

FDA TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE: DRAFT PROPOSALS FOR PUBLIC COMMENT REGARDING

DISCLOSURE POLICIES OF THE U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION 48-49 (May 2010), available

at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AboutFDA/Transparency/PublicDisclosure/GlossaryofAcronyms
andAbbreviations/UCM21211 0.pdf.
21. 78 Fed. Reg. 33421 (Jun. 4, 2013).
22.

EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY & HEADS OF MEDICINES AGENCIES, HMA/EMA

GUIDANCE DOCUMENT ON THE IDENTIFICATION OF COMMERCIALLY CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
AND PERSONAL DATA WITHIN THE STRUCTURE OF THE MARKETING AUTHORISATION (MA)
APPLICATION-RELEASE
OF INFORMATION
AFTER THE GRANTING OF A MARKETING

AUTHORISATION (Mar. 2012), availableat http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/enGB/documentlibrary/
Other/2012/03/WC500124536.pdf.
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changed its own long-standing view that the clinical modules of applications
were confidential.2 3 Several lawsuits were brought in early 2012 challenging
application of the EMA's policy, 24 and interim measures had been granted at
the time of this Article's drafting. In June 2013, consistent with its new
position, the EMA released a draft policy on proactive release of clinical trial
data.25 The fate of the EMA policy remains unclear, but the issue is likely to
end up in the European Commission and Parliament if not preempted by some
sort of voluntary arrangement.
Others have joined the discussion, including medical journal editors,26
various public figures, 27 and industry.28 With the exception of the researchbased biopharmaceutical industry, writers in this space almost uniformly
support release of the safety and effectiveness information in applications. The
health policy arguments cited in favor of disclosure, discussed in Section II,
include the argument that industry may not have the incentive or ability to
perform some socially beneficial research with the information in question.
Some who support release also believe that the publicly available information
is biased in favor of newer and more expensive medicines, driving up utilization
and healthcare costs. The academic literature directly on point is scant,
23. DECISION OF THE EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN CLOSING HIS INQUIRY INTO COMPLAINT
2560/2007/BEH AGAINST THE EUROPEAN MEDICINES AGENCY, EUROPEAN OMBUDSMAN, available

at http://www.ombudsman.europa.eu/en/cases/decision.faces/en/5459/html. The Cochrane Institute
had requested clinical study reports and trial protocols for certain anti-obesity drugs, so that they could
perform their own analysis. The Ombudsman rejected the EMA's view that disclosure to the Cochrane
Institute would harm the marketing authorization holder's commercial interests. Id.
24. Case T 29/13, AbbVie e.a. v. EMA, 2013 O.J. (C 079) 26; Case T 44/13, AbbVie e.a. v.
EMA, 2013 O.J. (C 079) 53; Case T 73/13, InterMune v. EMA, 2013 O.J. (C 114) 38.
25.

DRAFT POLICY, EMA, PUBLICATION AND ACCESS TO CLINICAL-TRIAL DATA (June 24,

2013), available at http://www.ema.europa.eu/docs/enGB/document library/Other/2013/06/WC500
144730.pdf. This document generally takes the position that clinical trial data "cannot be considered"
confidential commercial information. Id. at line 50.
26. See, e.g., Katie Thomas, Medical Journalto Require More Details on Drug Trials, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 31, 2012, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/l l/01/business/british-medicaljoumal-to-require-detailed-clinical-trial-data.html?_r-0 ("The British Medical Journal has announced
that, beginning in January, it will no longer publish the results of clinical trials unless drug companies
and researchers agree to provide detailed study data on request.").
27. See, e.g., BEN GOLDACRE, BAD PHARMA: How DRUG COMPANIES MISLEAD DOCTORS
AND HARM PATIENTS (2012).

28. See, e.g., European Fed'n of Pharm. Indus. and Ass'ns [EFPIA], EFPIA Position
TransparencyofInformation on Clinical Trials Included in the ProposedEU Database(Article 78 of
the Proposal for a Regulation on Clinical Trials) (Dec. 10, 2012); Letter from Steve Miller, Executive
Vice President of Regulatory Affairs, NPAF, to FDA, Div. of Dockets Mgmt. (HFA-305) (July 20,
2010). At least in part in response to the threat of disclosure in Europe, industry has recently committed
to sharing patient-level and study-level data, and protocols, for medicines and uses approved in the
United States and Europe, with qualified scientific and medical researchers for research purposes.
Principles for Responsible Clinical Trial Data Sharing, PHRMA, (July 18, 2013),
http://www.phrma.org/print/1277.
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although important contributions have been made by Professors Lemmens and
Telfer (who argue for disclosure primarily from a right to health), Professor
Reichman (who argues for disclosure partially on the ground that clinical trials
are a public good), and Professor Cahoy (who argues for tort reform linked to
disclosure). 2 9 As discussed later, it is possible to shape a narrow approach to
data release that responds in large part to Professors Lemmens and Telfer.
Professor Reichman ultimately argues for more profound changes to the way
we test and approve new medicines, which are beyond the scope of this Article,
but the "public good" concept may not be fully on point. Professor Cahoy's
points are well taken. Others whose work might have implications for the
issue-including scholars writing in the trade secret field-have generally not
considered this type of information good or the unique context in which it is
created and shared.
II. PLACING DISCLOSURE WITHIN THE LEGAL LANDSCAPE
The clinical module of an application is generally considered to be trade
secret. Labeling it as trade secret is, however, analytically problematic; the
label fits awkwardly, trade secret law itself concerns private relationships and
not relationships with the government, and the doctrinal debate about the nature
of trade secret law collapses in a regulatory context. This Article therefore
proposes to consider the property question from first principles. Application of
Lockean labor theory leads to the conclusion that this content is property, and
this conclusion can also be justified on utilitarian grounds. Labeling this
content as property in turn leads to application of the Fifth Amendment. The
special context in which this content is generated and functions allows us to
frame the right to exclude more carefully, however, and leads to an important
distinction between preventing disclosure and preventing use. Thus, depending
on additional factors-some within the control of the disclosing regulator and
some not-disclosure may or may not obliterate all of the right to exclude.
This, then, is another reason to reject the trade secret label: it has prompted
courts and scholars to assume erroneously that disclosure of premarket testing
information eliminates its status as property. I agree that public policy
29. See Trudo Lemmens & Candice Telfer, Access to Information and the Right to Health: The
Human Rights Casefor Clinical Trials Transparency, 38 AM. J.L. & MED. 63, 66 (2012); Jerome H.
Reichman, Rethinking the Role of Clinical Trial Data in InternationalIntellectual PropertyLaw: The
Casefor a Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 9 (2009); Daniel R. Cahoy,
Medical Product Information Incentives and the Transparency Paradox,82 IND. L.J. 623, 626-27
(2007). Others have written about the issue or subsidiary issues while tackling broader or ancillary
topics. See, e.g., Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents,Product Exclusivity, and Information Dissemination:
How Law Directs BiopharmaceuticalResearch and Development, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 477 (2003);
Kevin Outterson, PharmaceuticalArbitrage: Balancing Access and Innovation in International
PrescriptionDrug Markets, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHICS 193 (2005).
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considerations point towards carefully controlled disclosure to, or sharing with,
certain third parties for general medical research. I conclude that policymakers
should consider measures that would blunt any taking they effect, for instance
by protecting some of the right to exclude. But once private property is taken,
the right to just compensation applies. In-kind compensation is a possibility,
but policymakers may want to incentivize volunteerism instead.
A. Classificationas Trade Secret
Broadly speaking, trade secret law relates to and in some fashion protects
ideas, inventions, or knowledge (or other analogous intangibles) that are kept
mostly secret by a business and are valuable to the business because of that
secrecy. The definitions of "trade secret" to which most scholars and courts
refer can be found in the Restatement (First) of Torts, published by the
American Law Institute (ALI) in 1939, and the Uniform Trade Secrets Act
(UTSA), adopted forty years later. Both the Restatement and the UTSA
concern themselves with the liability that attaches when one private party
commits an act with respect to the trade secret of another private party. This
aspect of trade secret law traces its origins to English common law. 3 0
Section 757 of the Restatement laid out a general principle of liability for
unauthorized disclosure or use of trade secrets. Comment b described a "trade
secret" as "any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is
used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it" but explicitly eschewed
definition. 3 ' The Restatement also described factors to consider, including the
extent to which the information is known outside the business; the extent to
which it is known by employees and others involved in the business; measures
taken to guard the secrecy of the information; the value of the information to
the company and its competitors; the effort or money expended by the company
in developing the information; and the ease or difficulty with which the
information could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. None of these
factors was meant to be dispositive. Most courts agree that the Restatement
concept reaches safety and efficacy information in modern drug applications. 32
30. See infra note 57.
31. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) ("An exact definition ofa trade
secret is not possible.").
32. See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1286 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(quoting McGarity & Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety Testing Information
Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L.REV. 837, 961 (1980)) ("Strictly applied, 'this
definition would classify virtually all undisclosed health and safety testing data as trade secrets."');
A.L. Labs., Inc. v. Philips Roxane, Inc., 803 F.2d 378, 381 (8th Cir. 1986) (upholding jury decision
that "study data" in a new animal drug application constituted trade secrets in accordance with the
Restatement (First) of Torts § 757).
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Analogously, in the seminal Supreme Court case relating to use and disclosure
of testing data submitted to the Environmental Protection Agency, Ruckelshaus
v. Monsanto, the parties stipulated that "much of the information, research, and
test data" that Monsanto had submitted for approval of its pesticide
"contain[ed] or relate[d] to trade secrets as defined by the Restatement of
Torts.""
In 1979, the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws
(NCCUSL), now known as the Uniform Law Commission (ULC), adopted the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA). The ULC serves a very different purpose
from the American Law Institute. Rather than restating what they believe to be
general principles of common law, its members are appointed by state
governments to draft model legislation in order to achieve "clarity and stability"
in areas of state law where "uniformity is desirable and practical."34 The
drafting of uniform laws is a forward-looking exercise, not a retrospective
synthesis, although a model law that departs substantially from the common
law is unlikely to be favored in the state legislatures. The UTSA, which has
now been adopted in forty-seven states, D.C., Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, defines a trade secret as "information" that: (1) "derives independent
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain
economic value from its disclosure or use" and (2) "is the subject of efforts that
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."" This is
similar to the Restatement definition, except it does not require that the
information be used in business, and it adds a requirement that the information

33. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. 986, 1001-02 (1984).
34. About the ULC, UNIFORM LAW COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Narrative.aspx

?title=About%20the%20ULC. Uniformity is desirable with respect to trade secret law for the very
reason that the multi-national nature of modem medicines law has become problematic: the action of
one rogue state (for instance, abolishing the concept of "trade secrets" altogether) would have profound
extraterritorial implications. In the United States, constitutional principles-including the dormant
commerce clause-would probably constrain a state in this regard. In the international context, it may
ultimately become necessary to bring the issue into treaty negotiations. Whether and to what extent
Article 39.3 of the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS
Agreement) already prohibits signatory countries from releasing data that can be used by competitors
in a foreign jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this article but has generated a considerable amount of
academic scholarship, generally hostile to the view. See, e.g., Reichman, supra note 29, at 8; see also
CARLOS MARIA CORREA, PROTECTION OF DATA SUBMITTED FOR THE REGISTRATION OF
PHARMACEUTICALS: IMPLEMENTING THE STANDARDS OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT at ix-x, xiii, 1416, 47-52, 57-58 (2002).
35. U.T.S.A. § 1(4) (amended 1985); See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 (1995) ("A trade secret is any information that can be used in the operation of a
business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential

economic advantage over others.").
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be the subject of reasonable efforts to ensure secrecy.36 Neither distinction
matters here. The safety and efficacy information at issue is used by
biopharmaceutical manufacturers (to obtain marketing authorization, for
instance) and is the subject of extensive efforts to maintain secrecy.37
The information at issue, therefore, is clearly protected by state trade secret
law. Although various federal statutes also employ the phrase, these statutes
are not analogous to this body of law. They do not concern themselves with
the liability that attaches when one private party commits an act with respect to
the trade secret of another private party. 38 Instead, they relate to release by a
regulator. These public laws are FOIA, the federal Trade Secrets Act (TSA),
and the FDCA, discussed briefly below. As explained below, these laws do not
independently give meaning to the phrase. They incorporate the state law
meaning, and the question for the courts has become whether they incorporate
the Restatement definition of the phrase or some other definition.
The most important development in this regard was a 1983 decision of the
D.C. Circuit relating to Exemption 4 of FOIA.3 9 This exemption permits
agencies to decline to disclose "'trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person [that is] privileged or confidential." 4 0 FDA
took the position that undisclosed safety and efficacy information was governed
by the phrase "trade secret." At issue were summaries of adverse reaction and
complication data, adverse reaction reports, reports of prior experiences, recall
and product defect information, and information in export approval letters-all

36. Courts applying the state statutes tend to consider the six factors laid out in comment b of
the Restatement. See I ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01
(2013).
37. For instance, there is extensive security at manufacturing facilities and corporate offices to
prevent unauthorized access to and release of confidential information. Company employees typically
receive training on proper procedures for handling confidential information. Access is limited through
password protection and other security measures preventing access by employees who do not need the
information to perform their job functions. Internal company documents are frequently marked with
trade secret and/or confidential commercial information designations. Contractors engaged to support
applications are required to sign confidentiality agreements. Documents ultimately submitted to
regulators are often expressly rmarked as confidential. Companies usually have rigorous publication
review procedures to prevent inadvertent disclosure of trade secrets. If the data and information are
subject to discovery during litigation, companies will often seek robust protective orders.
38. There is one exception. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, 110
Stat. 3488 (EEA), criminalizes misappropriation of trade secrets. The definition of "trade secret" in
the EEA is not materially different from the definition in the UTSA. Id. § 1839(3). A criminal law
does not function like a statute authorizing trade secret owners to pursue injunctive relief or money
damages. Its effectiveness in protecting the interests of industry depends entirely on prosecutorial
interest.
39. Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1290.
40 Id

50

MARQ. INTELL. PROP.L. REV.

[Vol. 18:1

submitted to FDA by manufacturers of intraocular lenses. 4 1 The Court of
Appeals conceded that the Restatement would "classify virtually all
undisclosed health and safety testing data as trade secrets."4 2 It asserted,
however, a second strand of common law jurisprudence that defined the phrase
more narrowly, incorporating "a direct relationship between the information at
issue and the productive process." 4 3 It further noted that this "restrictive
approach" was adopted in the only pre-FOIA case interpreting the phrase "trade
secret" in the federal Trade Secrets Act, "a source to which," the court assumed,
"Congress surely would have looked."44 Thus, the court concluded, "the term
'trade secrets' in Exemption 4 of the FOIA should be defined in its narrower
common law sense, which incorporates a direct relationship between the
information at issue and the productive process."4 5
Whether the Public Citizen case controls with respect to safety and
effectiveness information in new drug and biologics applications is unclear, 6
but the reasoning of the court is vulnerable. For instance, the invocation of a
second significant strand of common law jurisprudence is not borne out by the
literature on trade secret law; most scholars take the view that the Restatement
faithfully synthesized the common law.47 Also, the primary legislative history
of FOIA does not indicate that Congress considered the Restatement or that it
looked to judicial interpretation of the Trade Secrets Act.48 The reasoning of
41. Brief of Appellant, Public Citizen Health Research Grp v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280 (D.C Cir.
1983) (No. 82-1745), 1982 WL 608916 at *10.
42. Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1286.
43. Id.at 1288.
44. Id., 704 F.2d. at 1287 (citing United States ex rel. Norwegian Nitrogen Prods. Co. v. United
States Tariff Comm'n, 6 F.2d 491, 495 (D.C. Cir. 1925), vacated,274 U.S. 106 (1927)).
45. Pub. Citizen, 704 F.2d at 1288.
46. Safety and effectiveness information are still protected under Exemption 4. The exemption
separately protects commercial information that is privileged or confidential. And this concept has
been held to reach, and is viewed by FDA as reaching, safety and effectiveness information. See, e.g.,
Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 185 F.3d 898 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding that safety and
effectiveness data in investigational new drug applications fall within exemption 4 as confidential
commercial information).
47. Some have, however, argued that the narrow Public Citizen definition should be extended
to other contexts. See, e.g., Richard S. Fortunato, Note, FDA DisclosureofSafety and Efficacy Data:
The Scope of Section 301(), 52 FORDHAM L. REV. 1280, 1283 (1984) (arguing that the narrow

definition from Public Citizen should be adopted for purposes of section 301(j) of the FDCA). Even
prior to the decision, some urged the agency to abandon the Restatement definition for FOIA purposes.
See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity & Sidney A. Shapiro, The Trade Secret Status of Health and Safety
Testing Information: Reforming Agency Disclosure Policies, 93 HARV. L. REV. 837, 862-63 (1980).

48. The legislative history of Public Law 89-487 does not mention the Restatement. Although
there was discussion of 18 U.S.C. § 1905 in the hearings, it was mostly government witnesses speaking
of the statute, and the issue appears to have largely been the relationship between the two schemes.
See, e.g., FederalPublic Records Law, Pt. 1: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Foreign Operations
& Gov't Info. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations,89th Cong. 30 (1965) (exchange between Benny
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the Court of Appeals is also undermined by the fact that the federal Trade
Secrets Act-to which the Court purported to be referring-is interpreted to
reach testing data. This criminal statute prohibits unauthorized disclosure of
trade secrets by federal officials and agencies. 4 9 Courts have generally agreed
with federal agencies that this provision is coextensive with Exemption 4,
reaching testing data and analyses, just as the Restatement does.o
Section 301() of the FDCA contains a prohibition similar to that of the
TSA: it prohibits any person from revealing "information acquired under the
authority of' the NDA requirement "concerning any method or process which
as a trade secret is entitled to protection." 5 ' FDA views this prohibition as

L. Kass, counsel, Foreign Operations & Gov't Info. Subcomm. and Norbert A. Schlei, Assistant Att'y
Gen., Dep't of Justice); Federal Public Records Law, Pt. I: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Foreign
Operations & Gov't Info. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 89th Cong. 67 (1965) (exchange
between Benny L. Kass, counsel, Foreign Operations & Gov't Info. Subcomm. and Fred Burton Smith,
Acting Gen. Counsel, Treasury Dep't). The case cited by the D.C. Circuit also does not appear in the
key Senate and House hearings and reports from 1966.
49. The current statute was adopted in 1948 when Congress consolidated three prior
nondisclosure statutes: a Commerce Department Statute, a revenue statute, and a Tariff Commission
Statute. See H.R. REP.NO. 80-304, at A127-28 (1947). The latter was the only one of the three to
prohibit disclosure of trade secrets. The reference to trade secrets can be traced to the Revenue Act of
1916, but the legislative history of the time sheds no light on its meaning. The revenue statute was
originally passed in 1864 and prohibited disclosure of the "operations, style of work, or apparatus of
any manufacturer or producer" by revenue officers. Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 38, 13 Stat. 223,
238 (1864). The legislative history yields no information beyond what the Supreme Court observed
in 1979, that "Congress was primarily concerned with unauthorized disclosure of business information
by feckless or corrupt revenue agents." Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 296 (1979).
50.

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT

OF JUSTICE GUIDE TO THE FREEDOM OF

INFORMATION ACT, at 354 (2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/oip/foiaguide09/exemption4
.pdf ("Finally, it should be noted that the Trade Secrets Act ... prohibits the disclosure of much more
than simply 'trade secret' information and instead prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of all data
protected by Exemption 4. ... Indeed, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit and
nearly every court that has considered the issue has found the Trade Secrets Act and Exemption 4 to
be 'coextensive."'); 76 Fed. Reg. 21432, 21518 (Apr. 15, 2011) (noting in a final rule promulgated by
the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services that Exemption 4 "is as co-extensive with the Trade
Secrets Act"); 61 Fed. Reg. 16424, 16425 (proposed April 15, 1996) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. Part
0) ("Thus, if information may be withheld under Exemption 4, the [Federal Communications
Commission] is barred from disclosing it by the terms of the Trade Secrets Act unless the disclosure
is otherwise authorized by law.").
51. 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2006). Section 301(j) of the Act does not mention information acquired
under the authority of the BLA provision, but there is a strong argument it applies. In 1972, when
authority for reviewing biologics was transferred to FDA, the Commissioner of Food and Drugs noted
that "all applicable provisions of the [FDCA]" would apply to biologics and that the Division of
Biologics Standards would have authority to enforce all aspects of the FDCA "except for sections 302
and 304," thereby implying that section 301 applied. 37 Fed. Reg. 4004, 4004-05 (Feb. 25, 1972).
And FDA routinely applies the rest of section 301 to biologics. Congress codified this approach in
1997, when it enacted section 3510) of the PHSA. This section provides that "[t]he [FDCA] applies
to a biological product subject to regulation under [PHSA section 351], except that a product for which
a license has been approved under [section 351(a)] shall not be required to have an approved
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nondiscretionary 5 2 and has, since its inception, treated section 301(j) as
reaching safety and effectiveness information in applications. No court has
directly addressed the issue, although the Tenth Circuit has rejected the
argument that the term "concerning" extends the reach of the provision beyond
trade secrets (i.e., that information concerning a trade secret method might
include information that is not, in itself, trade secret). The case, Anderson v.
Dep 't of Health & Human Servs.,54 involved an attempt to compel FDA to
application under section 505 of such Act." 42 U.S.C. § 262(j) (2006). Although BLAs are not
submitted under section 505, this provision brings them within the protections of section 301(j), which
is part of the FDCA. And, indeed, FDA withholds the contents of BLAs from public disclosure. See
Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Legislative History of the
Biologics Price CompetitionandInnovation Act of2009, 65 FOOD& DRUG L.J. 671,688 (2010) ("[T]

the authors' knowledge the agency never released the full preclinical and clinical package from a
BLA."); Richard A. Epstein, The ConstitutionalProtection of Trade Secrets and Patents Under the
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of2009, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 285, 290 (2011) ("1

am aware of only one case in which a competitor successfully requested access to a company's safety
and effectiveness data" but noting that FDA interpreted its disclosure regulations for BLAs "in a way
that allowed it to limit the disclosure it was prepared to authorize.").
52. See 39 Fed. Reg. 44602, 44619 (Dec. 24, 1974) ("The Commissioner advises ... that he
has no discretion to release trade secret information. All records subject to the trade secrets exemption
from the Freedom of Information Act are prohibited from public disclosure pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 1905
and 21 U.S.C. 331(j)."); Jerome Stevens Pharms. v. FDA, 402 F.3d 1249, 1252 (D.C. Cir. 2005)
(stating that "[t]he parties appear to agree that the disclosure of trade secrets is not a discretionary
function because federal laws [including 21 U.S.C. § 331(j)] prohibit it"); Anderson v. Dep't of Health
& Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 950 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that section 301(j)'s "prohibition against
disclosure is absolute").
53. 39 Fed. Reg. at 44634 ("The [FDA] Commissioner advises that, since 1938, it has been the
consistent administrative interpretation that [section 301(j)] can encompass animal and human
data...."); Business Record Exemption ofthe Freedom ofInformation Act: HearingsBefore the Gov't
Info. & Individual Rights Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations, 95th Cong. 70 (1977)

(statement of Dr. Donald Kennedy, Comm'r, FDA) ("We have interpreted, since, 1938, the term
'method of process which as a trade secret is entitled to protection' under section 301(j) of our law as
encompassing animal and human testing data."); Richard A. Merrill, The ArchitectureofGovernment
Regulation of Medical Products, 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1792 n.122 (1996) (noting that "FDA has
consistently taken the legal position that unpublished safety and effectiveness data submitted as part
of an NDA are confidential and cannot be released to the public or used to support another
manufacturer's NDA. This position is based on the FDA's longstanding interpretation of the FD&C
Act, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the Trade Secrets Act." (footnotes omitted) (citing
Ellen J. Flannery & Peter Barton Hutt, Balancing Competition and Patent Protection in the Drug
Industry: The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, 40 FOOD DRUG
CosM. L.J. 269, 275 (1985)); David M. Dudzinski, Reflections on Historical,Scientific, and Legal
Issues Relevant to DesigningApproval Pathwaysfor Generic Versions ofRecombinant Protein-Based
Therapeutics and Monoclonal Antibodies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 143, 214 (2005) ("FDA's long

standing interpretation is that information submitted to demonstrate safety and effectiveness is
proprietary, nonpublic information that is protected from disclosure under 21 U.S.C. § 331( j)."); see,
e.g., United States v. Pastor, 419 F. Supp. 1318, 1342 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (noting that Bureau ofNarcotics
and Dangerous Drugs' SCID unit did not have access to "raw data regarding drug safety" because
"FDA considered this information to be trade secret information" under section 331(j) of the Act).
54. Anderson v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1990).
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disclose documents in applications relating to an unapproved liquid silicone
product. The manufacturer intervened arguing that the documents fell within
exemption 4 of FOIA, the TSA, section 301(j), and a confidentiality provision
specific to devices. 55 The district court agreed, but the Tenth Circuit reversed.
Among other things, it concluded that the term "concerning" in section 3010)
plays a structural, but not substantive, role. The court was guided by the fact
that FOIA is broadly construed in favor of disclosure and its exemptions
narrowly construed. That is, the court let the policies of FOIA guide its
interpretation of the FDCA. Under the Tenth Circuit view, although the court
did not address this point, safety and efficacy data in drug applications probably
would not be protected under section 3010). That does not appear to be FDA's
view, however.
In brief, various relevant public laws use the phrase "trade secret," and for
the most part the protection of these laws reaches safety and effectiveness
information. But these laws borrow the phrase and concept from the
substantive common law of trade secrets; they do not comprise a meaningful
part of the substantive law themselves.
B. Analytical Problems with Trade Secret Classification
While safety and effectiveness information in drug applications is trade
secret under conventional trade secret law principles (and most public laws
relating to disclosure or release of testing data and analyses), labeling this
content as trade secret is analytically problematic. To begin with, historically
and doctrinally trade secret law is really mostly private law or, at least, mostly
about action taken in connection with relationships between private partiesnot between a person and the government. Further, the enduring debate in trade
secret law, whether the law's origins lie in principles of property or principles
of unfair competition, arguably collapses in the regulatory context. In this
context, we care whether this content is trade secret for two reasons: first,
because applicable public laws like FOIA incorporate the phrase as defined in
state law (but do not incorporate trade secret law itself); and second, because
various constitutional principles attach to property and the Supreme Court has
said that, for purposes of these principles, trade secrets are property. 56 But these
principles attach to property, not to trade secrets. Getting to property status for
constitutional purposes through the trade secret label is unnecessary and, as
shown in Part II(D)(1) may lead to an outcome inconsistent with property status

55. Id. at 940. After the manufacturer filed its IND for injectable silicone, Congress passed
amendments to the FDCA giving FDA authority to regulate medical devices. As a result, injectable
silicone was reclassified from a drug to a medical device. Id. at 939.
56. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04.
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in the first instance.
1. Trade Secret Law is Not Directly on Point
Trade secret law in the United States is usually traced through an 1868
decision of the Massachusetts Supreme Court, Peabody v. Norfolk.57 Both
before and after Peabody,trade secret law in the United States has been a matter
of common law. The doctrine that evolved in the states was fairly uniform,
however, at least in part because of its origin in English common law' 8 and
probably also because the basic principles (as articulated in Peabody for
instance) are necessary for the orderly working of an industrial society with
increasingly interstate commerce.59
Peabody concerned confidential information shared by Joseph Peabody
with John Norfolk in connection with Norfolk's employment as an engineer in
Peabody's jute (gunny cloth) factory. The information related to the
construction and operation of machinery in the factory. Peabody alleged in his
initial prayer for injunction that Norfolk had left his employment, made
arrangements with others to build a competing factory, and shared with them
information about Peabody's manufacturing process and machinery, including
drawings. After Norfolk was enjoined, Peabody identified a recipient of the
secrets, James Cook, who was pretending to build competing machinery in his
own name, using information, models, and drawings obtained from Norfolk,
with full notice of the relationship between Peabody and Norfolk. A second
injunction, against Cook, was also granted.60
The court began by asserting the policy of the law "for the advantage of the
public, to encourage and protect invention and commercial enterprise." 6 1
Before turning to the facts at hand, the court devoted six paragraphs to laying
out a theory for protection of business secrets grounded at least in part in the
language of private property. "If a man establishes a business and makes it
valuable by his skill and attention," the court observed, "the good will of that
business is recognized by the law as property." 62 Moreover, "[i]f he invents or
57. 98 Mass. 452 (1868); see, e.g., Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine
in Search ofJustification, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 241, 252 (1998); James W. Hill, Trade Secrets, Unjust
Enrichment, and the ClassificationofObligations,4 VA. J.L. & TECH. 2, 12 (1999); Michael Risch,
Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, II MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5 (2007) (citing Peabody, 95
Mass. 425 at 458).
58. E.g., Bone, supra note 57, at 252 & n.55 (discussing various English cases from the 1800s).
59. See, e.g., U.T.S.A. § 8 (amended 1985) ("This [Act] shall be applied and construed to
effectuate its general purposes to make uniform the law with respect to the subject of this [Act] among
states enacting it.").
60. Peabody, 98 Mass. at 461.
61. Id.at457.
62. Id
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discovers, and keeps secret, a process of manufacture, whether a proper subject
for a patent or not, . . . he has a property in it." 63 Ultimately, "it is settled that
a secret art is a legal subject of property."" Thus, "a bond for a conveyance of
the exclusive right to it is not open to the objection of being in restraint of trade,
but may be enforced by action at law, and requires the obligor not to divulge
the secret to any other person." 65
Although Peabody does not represent the birth of trade secret law in this
country, the decision is seminal because it collected and synthesized earlier
cases and laid out a coherent theory for the doctrine. The court left an important
gap, however: if a man "invents or discovers, and keeps secret, a process of
manufacture, whether a proper subject for patent or not," although he has a
property interest, "he has not indeed an exclusive right to it against the public,
or against those who in good faith acquire knowledge of it." This sentence
signals the notion that information held trade secret can be "reverse
engineered"-independently discovered by a third party-with impunity. And
it suggests the early doctrine did not consider public law issues. Indeed, as
explained in the paragraphs that follow, trade secret law still mostly does not
account for the realities of the modem regulatory state. The doctrine emerged
within the context of, and academic and judicial writing continues to focus on,
private relationships. 66
Section 757 of the Restatement, which synthesized the common law as of
1939, set out a general principle of liability for unauthorized use or disclosure
of trade secrets. Liability attached if:
(a) [the defendant] discovered the trade secret by improper means ...
(b) his disclosure or use constitute[d] a breach of confidence ... (c) he
learned the secret from a third party with notice of the fact that it was
secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or that
the third person's disclosure .

.

. [was] .

.

. a breach of his duty . . . or

(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was secret and
its disclosure was made to him by mistake. 67
The model law created in the 1970s took a similar approach: the goal was
to provide remedies for misappropriation, defined broadly to mean both: (1)
acquisition through improper means, and (2) use or disclosure without consent
63. Id. at 458.
64. Id. at 459-60.

65. Id. at 460 (citation omitted).
66. One notable exception in the literature is chapter 12 of Milgrim's treatise on trade secrets.
See MILGRIM, supra note 36, at ch. 12.
67. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
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and with some degree of culpability (e.g., knowledge that the secret was
acquired under circumstances giving rise to a duty of confidentiality).68
The Restatement and UTSA theories comprise the basic essence of trade
secret law. The theories can, in principle, work in the regulatory setting. That
is, an injunction would appear warranted where a regulator discloses trade
secrets without consent and with knowledge that the trade secrets were acquired
with the expectation that they would be kept confidential. State statutes
adopting the UTSA are not, however, typically invoked by plaintiffs in such a
manner, 6 9 and there is no true federal equivalent. The federal statute
criminalizing misappropriation of trade secrets does not provide relief against
the government.70
Further, basic assumptions of trade secret law do not apply to this content.
Most notably, the classic hallmarks of reverse engineering and independent
discovery do not apply. While it may be true that trade secrets are not good
against the rest of the world because others may independently discover them,71
the point is almost nonsensical with respect to safety and effectiveness
information. If a third person were to stumble independently into the secret for
Coca Cola, for instance, the rule is that person would be free to make and sell
its product. If the formula were instead patented, it would be widely known,
but federal law would, for a time, preclude its use. Thus, an inventor faces a
choice between patent law (which blocks competition even in the event of
independent discovery but ends after twenty years) and trade secret status
(which provides no protection against independent discovery but is infinite in
duration). It is, however, logically impossible for another person to
independently discover the results of a clinical trial, which was performed some
years earlier, with particular lots of an investigational product, and involved
administration to particular individuals on particular days and measurement of
specific parameters from those individuals. It is also logically impossible to
independently generate the sponsor's judgments about how to describe the
product and results, in view of its own business strategy and after particular
68. See U.T.S.A. § 1(2) (amended 1985).
69. The Uniform Trade Secrets Act contemplates such a cause of action. A "person" liable for
misappropriation of trade secrets is defined to include a "governmental subdivision or agency."
UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § I (amended 1985). Injunctions against government officials are
available under other state statutes, however, and these laws seems to be more commonly invoked.
See, e.g., Lane v. Commonwealth, 517 N.E.2d 1281, 1282 (Mass. 1988) (holding that the plaintiff
would be entitled to an injunction against state officials and employees under the Massachusetts Tort
Claims Act if she could establish that the defendants were wrongfully using her trade secrets in the
form of a computer software package used to compile municipal financial data).
70. The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-294, § 1833, 110 Stat. 3488.
71. E.g., Pamela Samuelson & Suzanne Scotchmer, The Law and Economics of Reverse
Engineering, Ill YALE L.J. 1575, 1582-83 (2002).
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conversations with particular persons at the agency. The possibility of
independent discovery makes sense with respect to the formula for Coca Cola
or the design of an aircraft. But the possibility of independent discovery, which
features prominently in trade secret scholarship, and the classic choice between
patent protection and trade secret status, makes no sense for the content at issue
here. And the possibility that one might be able to reverse engineer the product
is irrelevant. The information at issue here is not "how to make the product"it is instead the data, information, and analyses generated and prepared to
overcome the regulatory barrier to market entry.
2. The Doctrinal Debate Collapses
A great deal of scholarship has attempted to make sense of trade secret law,
categorizing and critiquing its various justifications and objectives and, in at
least one instance, also suggesting that at bottom there is no such thing as a
coherent and separate body of trade secret law.72 The story this scholarship
tells of the history and black letter content of state trade secret law is consistent.
What varies meaningfully, however, is whether and how scholars see an
underlying doctrine and how they describe and assess its justifications. In
particular, the scholarship is dominated by an enduring doctrinal debate:
whether trade secret law is primarily a law of liability (relationship) principles
or a law of property (exclusivity and ownership).
The argument that trade secret law in the United States is primarily a law
about the liability that attaches when parties in relationships violate social
norms rely heavily on a key sentence in Justice Holmes's 1917 decision, E.I.
3 Masland concerned secrets
du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v. Masland.7
learned by Walter Masland while employed by DuPont. Masland was
establishing a business that would manufacture artificial leather, and some of
the secrets at issue were relevant, although Masland himself asserted that much
of the information was in fact "well known to the trade." DuPont nevertheless
sought an injunction to prevent Masland from using or disclosing those secrets.
As part of the litigation, to defend against the injunction, Masland proposed to
72. See, e.g., Risch, supra note 57 at 26-37 (discussing economic, philosophical, and populist
justifications for trade secret protection); Hill, supra note 57 at 124 (identifying economic and moral
justifications for trade secret law; exploring property, contract, quasi-contract, and tort aspects of trade

secret law; and ultimately concluding that trade secret law is a "fusion" of tort and unjust enrichment
principles); Bone, supra note 57 (examining and rejecting arguments from efficiency, arguments from
rights and fairness, and arguments from norms about unfair competition); Jonathan R.K. Stroud, The
Tragedy of the Commons: Toward a Hybrid Property/RelationshipUnderstandingof Trade Secrets,
CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://ssm.com/abstract-2216659
(arguing that a hybrid approach will allow for prospective protection of trade secrets that have been
disclosed).
73. 244 U.S. 100 (1917).
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disclose the secrets in question to experts and witnesses. At issue before the
Supreme Court was the appropriateness of an injunction against disclosing the
trade secrets to experts, consultants, and defense counsel for purposes of
defense. The case was put to the Court as a conflict between the right of
property and the right to make a full defense. In a terse three-paragraph
opinion, Justice Holmes brushed that proposed conflict aside. Rather than
attempting to resolve a fundamental conflict of first principles, he picked a
narrower resolution: "Whether the plaintiffs have any valuable secret or not[,]
the defendant knows the facts, whatever they are, through a special confidence
he accepted. The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be." Thus,
"the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law,
but that the defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one
of them ... If there is any disadvantage in the fact that he knew the plaintiffs'
secrets, he must take the burden with the good."74
Those who favor the view that trade secret law is primarily a law of unfair
competition suggest that Justice Holmes effectively rejected the argument that
trade secrets were property. They note also that the drafters of the first
Restatement in 1939 took pains to distance trade secret liability principles from
property doctrine. Indeed, comment a noted that "[t]he suggestion that one has
a right to exclude others from the use of his trade secret because he has a right
of property in the idea has been frequently advanced and rejected."75 According
to the drafters, "[t]he theory that has prevailed is that the protection is afforded
only by a general duty of good faith and that the liability rests upon breach of
this duty." 76 In other words, they asserted, the essence of liability lies in breach
of contract, abuse of confidence, or improprieties in obtaining the secret.77 The
ALI later moved trade secrets entirely to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair
Competition, again reflecting the supposedly predominant view that trade
secret law is primarily about enforcing behavioral norms in business
relationships.78 While the language of natural property rights can be found in
early trade/business secret jurisprudence, this approach did not survive the
emergence of legal realism in the early twentieth century.79 Thus, this view
holds, trade secrets are not really property at all. Rather, trade secrets are
74. Id. at 102
75.

RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS

§

757 cmt. a (1939).

76. Id
77. Id
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§§

39-45 (1995).

79. For instance, Professor Bone states that legal realism "stripped away" the property
foundation (and therefore the "justifying theory") for trade secret law. Bone, supra note 57, at 251,
260 ("Why give legal protection to secret information? As I discuss later, this question had a relatively
clear answer in the late nineteenth century, but the answer lost its power to persuade with the
ascendancy of legal realism in the 1920s and 1930s."). Id. at 251.
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merely the subject of undertakings within the context of a relationship between
two parties.80 Some also make policy and normative arguments against the
treatment of trade secrets as property, suggesting that this leads to
overprotection of the assets in question. 8'
This Article subscribes to the position that trade secret law is instead
primarily about protection of property. Under this view, Masland must be
understood as an exercise in judicial restraint, a refusal to resolve the doctrinal
conflict presented by the petitioner. Justice Holmes meant only that the
property question-the tension between first principles-did not need to be
resolved in order for the case to be decided. 82 Further, it has been established
that despite the prompting of the ALI drafters, the cases that followed did not
accept the distancing from property concepts. 8 3 It is possible the ALI reporters
were reading the cases selectively or attempting to shape the law prospectively
in the first Restatement. To be sure, the ALI continued on its own path,
omitting the chapter on trade secrets in the second Restatement of Torts and
ultimately placing them in the third Restatement of Competition. But of these
Restatements, it is the initial 1939 Restatement of Torts that remains influential
in the courts and agencies with respect to trade secrets, comment a-which
most aggressively distanced trade secrets from property-generally forgotten.84

80. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Privacy as Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125,
1154 n.148 (2000) (arguing in part from the dictum in Masland); Pamela Samuelson, Information as
Property:Do Ruckelshaus andCarpenterSignal a Changing Direction in IntellectualPropertyLaw?,
38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989).
81. Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon, or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative
Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 69, 84 (1999); Samuelson,
Information as Property, supra note 80, at 399. As to over-protection, Professor Risch responds
persuasively that real property rights are themselves neither infinite nor impermeable. They are subject
to various limitations, including land use regulations and easements. Risch, supra note 57, at 24. This
is, indeed, the point of subsection 0 of this article, which suggests that although this content is property,
it can be taken, subject to Fifth Amendment compensation requirements.
82.

See, e.g., DONALD S. CHISUM, ET AL., UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW

199-200 (2d ed. 2011).
83. See, e.g., Id. at 206-207 ("The Restatement's authors also sought to purge the property
principle from trade secret laws[.] . . . To the contrary, the theory that has prevailed in the postRestatement era is that a property right in a trade secret, although terminated by public disclosure, will
be upheld against misappropriators and protected in a variety of contexts."). But see Samuelson,
Information as Property, supra note 80, at 365 ("Trade secret law has long afforded remedies to the
possessor of secret information against those who use improper means to obtain the secret and those
who disclose it in violation of confidential relationships, but the law has, in general, resisted
characterizing the secret itself as property.").
84. See generally MILGRIM, supranote 36, at § 1.01 (noting "universal reliance on §757 of the
1939 Restatement of Torts" and the fact that the Restatement (Third) of Competition "has not been
relied upon by many courts"). There are twenty-four published federal court cases and ten published
state court cases citing comment a. Many focus on the relationship between the parties, and some cite
Masland,but they constitute a minority of cases.
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Professor Epstein also points to a fundamental theoretical problem with the
view that trade secret protection derives from a relationship between two
parties: this would imply a lack of protection where the information is not
shared with anyone, which is illogical.ss
The debate endures, with some questioning why it even matters, 86 and
others arguing that the early cases and writings evidence strains from many
strands of thought, including contracts, torts, and ethics.87 Professor Milgrim
marries the two strands by arguing that the law of unfair competition applies
only because there is some sort of property at issue in the first instance and that
a property right is therefore inherently a relational right. 8 The debate is not
only about where the origins of trade secret law lie but also, of course, what the
appropriate approach should be going forward. This is an essentially positivist
debate to be having in the first instance. If assets generated through intellectual
labor are "property" in any sort of natural law sense-which most writers today
seem to discount-the debate would be beside the point. It is probably also
true that in the private law setting it is "unnecessary to call trade secrets
'property' in order to enforce confidences and penalize those who use improper
means to obtain . . . [those] secrets." 8 9

But the question whether trade secrets are property in any meaningful sense
or simply an interest or posture that is protected through liability rules and
behavioral norms collapses in a regulatory setting. The content in question is
provided to the government in exchange for a license to do business. The
relationship between the parties to this transaction is not one of private entities
on equal footing. Further, in a regulatory state, concepts like business ethics,
commercial morality, and even misappropriation are replaced functionally by
due process and other Fifth Amendment principles. Here, property status is
dispositive. Moreover, even the distinction between the doctrines collapses. It
makes no sense to consider whether the doctrine is property law (under which
85. Richard A. Epstein, The Constitutional Protection of Trade Secrets under the Takings
Clause, 71 U. CHI. L. REv. 57, 60 (2004).
86. E.g., Kenneth Einar Himma, Toward a Lockean Moral JustificationofLegal Protectionof
IntellectualProperty,SAN DIEGO L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2-3) (on file with author)
(arguing that the debate over whether content is property is a "distraction," because "the important
issue is whether content creators have a moral interest in the content they create that justifies legal
protection that allows them to exclude others.").
87. See, e.g., MILGRIM, supra note 36, at § 1.01. One could place Professor Bone in this group,
because he takes the view that trade secret law is "mainly just a collection of other legal norms." Bone,
supra note 57, at 243.
88. IA ROGER M. MILGRIM & ERIC E. BENSEN, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 2.01 at 2-9
(2013).
89. Samuelson, Information as Property, supra note 80, at 375. Whether state trade secret
statutes ultimately enforce commercial ethics or ownership principles, or both, they can be applied by
the courts without a view taken on the underlying doctrinal point. See, e.g., id at 375.
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reallocation of assets occurs through voluntary negotiation) or liability law
(under which reallocation of assets leads through business norms to a payment
requirement), because the government may in fact lawfully "take and pay" with
respect to property. Thus, all roads lead to the property question.
To be sure, in the regulatory setting, the trade secret label matters because
various applicable public laws use the phrase. The Federal Trade Secrets Act,
Exemption 4 of FOIA, and section 301(j) of the FDCA use the phrase. But, as
noted, these are not part of the substantive law of trade secrets; they simply
incorporate the concept by reference. In the core law that limits the actions of
the government with respect to the governed-the Constitution, and here the
Fifth Amendment-what really matters in this context is whether there is
"property" at issue. This Article therefore proposes laying aside the trade secret
question and working from first principles on the question whether the content
at issue is property.
C. The Property Question
1. Defining the Content as Property
In chapter 5 of his Second Treatise of Government, published in 1690, John
Locke posited that when one creates something of value through one's labor,
one owns the end result of that labor. 90 There is a fundamental difference of
opinion as to whether property arises automatically by operation of natural law,
in the sense that Locke envisioned, or is instead a creation of law, dependent
on the judgment of society that a particular right to use or exclude should be
protected. Locke's formulation was enormously influential in early American
political thought, 91 however, and, despite the influence of legal realism,
continues to echo through U.S. property doctrine. 92 Moreover, the Peabody

90. JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOvERNMENT, ch. 5 (C. B. Macpherson ed.,
Hackett Publishing Co. 1980) (1690). See, e.g., id. at § 27 ("Though the earth, and all inferior
creatures, be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person: this no body has
any right to but himself. The labour of his body, and the work of his hands, we may say, are properly
his. Whatsoever then he removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed
his labourwith, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property."); id at
§ 32 ("As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is
his property. He by his labour does, as it were, inclose it from the common.").
91. See, e.g., Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in Revolutionary
America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 474 (1976) (indicating Jefferson also adopted the Lockean view that a
man's "property was whatever he produced by dint of his personal labor. . . ."); 6 JAMES MADISON,
Property, in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 101 (Gailard Hunt ed., 1906) (writing after the Fifth
Amendment had been adopted that "[i]n its larger and juster meaning, [the term property] embraces
every thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right .... .").
92. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus 467 U.S. 1002-03 ("This general perception of trade secrets as
property is consonant with a notion of 'property' that extends beyond land and tangible goods and
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case itself echoed Locke.
Locke was writing about a resource open for development-non-scarce
land in the new world.94 In the most relevant respects, pharmaceutical research
and development is analogous." Properly understood, this research space is
not just non-scarce, it is infinite. A second entrant can build (or attempt to
build) the same molecule, or a variation of the molecule, and imagine its own
research and development program, perhaps to prove the same propositions,
perhaps to prove new propositions, can design trials, recruit entirely new
subjects in another part of the country, generate new data, package those data,
and seek its own approval. A third entrant can build an entirely different
molecule. No two research and development programs are identical-if for no
other reason, because it is a physical impossibility for trials and results to be
identical; they are the particular product of their time and place. Research and
development programs, and the resulting data and analyses, are inherently
infinite in permutations and in number. This asset is non-scarce in the sense
that a property right would not, in any fashion, block another person who
independently develops analogous information (the neighboring plot).
Approaching the question from the natural rights labor-oriented position of
Locke leads to the conclusion that the content of these applications is
property."
A utilitarian approach leads to the same conclusion. Biopharmaceutical
includes the products ofan individual's 'labour and invention."') (citing Locke as well as Blackstone's
Commentaries); Alaska Dep't of Natural Res. v. Arctic Slope Reg'l Corp., 834 P.2d 134, 137-39
(Alaska 1991) (finding that company's results from oil well drillings were property for state and federal
constitutional purposes and citing Locke).
93. Peabody, 98 Mass. at 457 ("If a man establishes a business and makes it valuable by his
skill and attention, the good will of that business is recognized by the law as property.").
94. See LOCKE, supra note 90, at § 33 ("Nor was this appropriationof any parcel of land, by
improving it, any prejudice to any other man, since there was still enough, and as good left; and more
than the yet unprovided could use. So that, in effect, there was never the less left for others because
of his enclosure for himself: for he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does as good as
take nothing at all."); id. at § 36 ("The measure ofproperty nature has well set by the extent of man's
labour and the conveniences of life: no man's labour could subdue, or appropriate all; nor could his
enjoyment consume more than a small part; so that it was impossible for any man, this way, to intrench
upon the right of another, or acquire to himself a property, to the prejudice of his neighbour, who would
still have room for as good, and as large a possession (after the other had taken out his) as before it
was appropriated.").
95. See also id. at §44 ("From all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are given
in common, yet man, by being master of himself, and proprietorof his own person, and the actions or
labour of it, had still in himself the greatfoundation of property; and that, which made up the great

part of what he applied to the support or comfort of his being, when invention and arts had improved
the conveniences of life, was perfectly his own, and did not belong in common to others.").
96. See also Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1549-64 (1993)

(applying Lockean principles to intellectual property).
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research and development generates the safety and efficacy information without
which the actual medicine could not be provided to patients. So long as the
regulatory state erects a barrier to entry for medicines, which requires the
creation of this intellectual content, society will benefit from the labor in
question. Property status, with its attendant right to exclude, allows the content
creator to benefit from his labor and provides the incentive for him to perform
it, for society's benefit. Indeed, Lockean theory itself has a utilitarian strain,
because society as a whole benefits from the labor that is put into creation of
the value in question. 9 7 A time-shifting variation of the "tragedy of the
commons" may also play out in the absence of property status: if every
competitor could immediately access, learn from, and use the safety and
effectiveness information generated by an innovator, many competitors could
profit, and perhaps through lower prices patients and government programs
(and thereby taxpayers) would benefit. But, appropriation of that property
immediately for the benefit of all may lead to less enthusiasm for innovative
research in the future-essentially killing the "golden goose" to the detriment
of future patients. 98 That said, the utilitarian argument for property status,
standing alone, invites abrogation of the right once adequate incentive has been
provided. 99 In my view, a positivist approach (content is property only because
and if the law says it is property) abandons any pretense to moral grounding for
basic property doctrine. Taken to an extreme, this approach to defining
property results in anarchy. If intellectual content can simply be reclassified as
not-property in the first instance, then so too can real property.
Considering the property question ab initio shows that commenters are off
the mark when they suggest that patent protection for the product renders
97. LOCKE, supra note 90, at § 37 ("To which let me add, that he who appropriates land to
himself by his labour, does not lessen, but increase the common stock of mankind: for the provisions
serving to the support of human life, produced by one acre of inclosed and cultivated land, are (to
speak much within compass) ten times more than those which are yielded by an acre of land of an
equal richness lying waste in common.").
98. A "tragedy of the commons" occurs where no one has the right to exclude, and the optimal
resource use for each individual (which ensues) leads to despoliation of the resource, to the detriment
of all. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy ofthe Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
99. For instance, some stakeholders justified twelve-year regulatory exclusivity for biological
products by reference to Professor Grabowski's work finding that the break-even point for most
biological molecules is between 12.9 and 16.2 years after approval. See BIO, A Follow-On Biologics
Regime Without Strong Data Exclusivity Will Stifle the Development of New Medicines 4 (Sept. 26,
2007), available at http://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/FOBSData exclusivity_20070926 0.pdf
(cited in Krista Hessler Carver, Jeffrey Elikan, & Erika Lietzan, An Unofficial Legislative History of
the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 671, 727 (2010));
Henry Grabowski, Data Exclusivity for New Biological Entities 21, 26 (Duke University Dep't. of
Econ., Working Paper, 2007). Some of the debate over the appropriate length of the exclusivity period
then shifted to whether this empirical assertion was correct, see id. at 735-37, with stakeholders
unintentionally conceding the shift from a natural rights perspective to a positivist perspective.
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protection of this content superfluous. 00 To be sure, they are also off the mark
analytically. Anything that might be patented (the compound, the formulation,
a manufacturing process, etc.) is different from the content at issue here (both
data and writing that reflect creativity, judgment, strategy, and labor and that
are intended to overcome a regulatory barrier to market entry). 10 ' Although
some might argue that generating the data is simply a cost of doing business in
the regulatory state and that a patent should provide sufficient incentive, there
are both policy and doctrinal responses.102 Some products receive no patent,
and for these, protection of the content in the application (through both nonreliance and non-disclosure rules) is all that stands between abandonment of
the molecule and a new medicine for patients.1 03 And if the state can use its
commerce power to erect regulatory barriers that functionally require, as a
condition of market access, the creation of (intellectual) property that is then
immediately confiscated for the public good, there is no principled way to draw
a line and preclude confiscation of patents or, even, real property as a condition
of market access.10 4 The theoretical point is therefore important. While patents
are a creation of positive law, the generation of ideas and data about an item
that may or may not be patented is labor that under Lockean principles results
in a property right of its own accord.
Concluding that the content at issue is property leads to the question what
rights comprise the bundle of property rights. The straightforward approach is
to work from first principles in property law, rather than to create a special list
100. In his work opposing data protection, for instance, Professor Reichman has noted that
would-be competitors generally cannot market a generic drug until patents expire. E.g., Reichman,
supra note 29, at 7. Emily Marden inverts the argument, suggesting that data exclusivity can render
patents unnecessary. See Emily Marden, Open Source Drug Development: A Path to More Accessible
Drugs and Diagnostics?, 11 MINN. J.L. SCi. & TECH. 217, 244-45 (2010).

101. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974) ("Each has its particular
role to play .... Trade secret law encourages the development and exploitation of those items of lesser
or different invention than might be accorded protection under the patent laws, but which items still
have an important part to play in the technological and scientific advancement of the Nation."); see
also CHISUM, supra note 82, at 3 ("To the extent there is a property interest in intellectual creations, it
is an intangible interest that must be carefully distinguished from property in tangible objects that either
make the creation possible or that the creation makes possible.").
102. There is also a practical response. Even where the product is protected by patent, the
safety and effectiveness information in the application could be used by a competitor to partially
support approval of a different and non-infringing product.
103. Drugs that have reached the market with no listed patents, but only regulatory exclusivity,
include: Mefloquine HCI (mefloquine hydrochloride), Clozaril (clozapine), Hexalen (altretamine),
Leustatin (cladribine), Trasylol (aprotinin bovine), Sclerosol (talc), and Ellence (epirubicin
hydrochloride). All were important enough to earn priority review at FDA. By the author's count,
over 100 NDAs approved since 1984 held exclusivity but had no listed patents. Congress has
considered enacting special incentives for medicines that are unlikely to be patentable and might not
otherwise be developed. E.g., MODDERN Cures Act of 2011, H.R. 3497, 112th Cong. § 201 (2011).
104. Epstein, supra note 51, at 307.
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that attaches to intellectual property or trade secrets per se.'05 When one owns
property, one has the right to use the property (or not), the right to permit (or
deny) others the right to use the property (often called the right to exclude,
though it is also a right to include, as selectively as one wishes), and the right
to dispose of the property (or not). 06 There is no particular reason why an asset
has to be tangible for these principles to apply, and the principles readily apply
to the assets at issue here.o 7
To begin with, one has the right to use or not use the property in question.
A biopharmaceutical manufacturer that generates safety and effectiveness data
and information about a new molecule has the right to use this asset as it sees
fit. This includes using the information to support approval of the product in
the United States, in Europe, and around the world. It includes not seeking
approval, for instance, in countries with regulators that are prone to releasing
confidential information or in countries where the company judges market
opportunities insufficient. The company may use the data and analysis to
generate new ideas. And it could use the content as a template for subsequent
research on similar molecules or second generation versions of the same
molecule. It could even lay the content entirely aside, having made a decision
not to seek approval of the product.
One also has the right to permit, or deny, others to use the property in
question-the right to exclude. A biopharmaceutical manufacturer that
generates a clinical module thus has the right to permit, or deny, others to use
the property. This could include permitting a second applicant to refer to the
information in its own regulatory filings, without seeing the information, i.e.,

105. Professor Risch describes a complex list of rights and duties attendant to trade secrets,
deriving from the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, Professor Milgrim's treatise, and the Supreme Court's
decision in Monsanto. See Risch, supra note 57, at 24-25 ("The right to keep certain information
secret and still obtain legal protection . .. [i]ncluding the right to exclude others from disclosing [and]
the right to exclude others . . . from using;" "[t]he duty to attempt to keep information secret;" "[t]he
right to use certain information as one wishes and still receive protection even if others have the same
information;" "[t]he right to not use certain information if one wishes and still obtain legal protection;"
"[t]he right to recover damages for harm caused by illicit use or disclosure;" "[t]he right to recover the
benefits from others for the illicit use or disclosure;" "[t]he right to transfer, devise, or otherwise make
exclusive grants;" and "[t]he right to compensation for a government taking of certain [property].").
Although Professor Risch suggests that these rights and duties are different from those associated with
other types of property, they may ultimately boil down to the three basic principles discussed in this
article.
106. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003 (quoting United States v. General Motors Corp.,
323 U.S. 373, 377-378 (1945)) ("the right to possess, use and dispose"); Minnesota Mining & Mfg. v.
Pribyl, 259 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2001) (citing Ruckelshaus and finding the trade secret property elements
to be the ability to use, disclose, and transfer).
107. Even those who argue that information should not be treated as property concede that these
concepts apply. See, e.g., Samuelson, Information as Property, supra note 80, at 370.
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selling a right of reference to a business partner. 08 It could include sharing the
protocols, case report forms, and tabulations with other business partners,
subject to confidentiality arrangements, but declining to share any other
materials. A company might share the raw data and tabulations, but not the
narratives, with an academic institution, so that institution could perform a
meta-analysis with similar material provided by other companies. Or the
company could decline to do all of these things, submitting the material only to
national regulatory authorities and always with the express request and
understanding that the material would be treated as confidential. In this case,
it would profit, indefinitely, from its ownership of the contents.1 09
Finally, one has the right to transfer or dispose of the property in question.
A biopharmaceutical company that generates a clinical module may transfer,
sell, or abandon its rights in the module in question. For example, when one
company acquires or merges with another, it may acquire the manufacturing
facilities, the right to manufacture and market the drugs and biologics in
question, the patent rights at issue, and ownership of (and access to) the relevant
NDA and BLA files."10
2. A Closer Look at the Right to Exclude
The right to exclude bears a closer look. The scope of the right to exclude
should derive from the universe of possible uses. To be sure, as Professor
Outterson points out, it is harder to exclude third parties from using knowledge
than from using physical property."' But when the content at issue here is fully
described (i.e., as more than just knowledge) and its possible uses by others
catalogued, it becomes evident that one can disclose this property, or even share
it selectively, and preserve some of the right to exclude. The paragraphs that

108. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.3 (2013) (defining right of reference for purpose of NDAs).
109. That ability to profit from ownership of the contents is subject to the fact that under the
laws of every country, a second entrant's drug can at some point be approved pursuant to a comparative
application without comparable support. The abbreviated application pathway is an important
limitation on the right to exclude and involves indirect reliance on the company's assets, which in
principle the company should have the right to exclude. See LOCKE, supra note 90, at § 34 ("He that
had as good left for his improvement, as was already taken up, needed not complain, ought not to
meddle with what was already improved by another's labour: if he did, it is plain he desired the benefit
of another's pains, which he had no right to, and not the ground which God had given him in common
with others to labor on, and whereof there was as good left, as that already possessed, and more than
he knew what to do with, or his industry could reach to.").
I 10. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 314.72, 314.99(a) (governing change in ownership of an NDA); FOOD
AND

DRUG ADMINISTRATION,

SOPP 8403:

ISSUANCE

AND

REISSUANCE

OF LICENSES FOR

BIOLOGICAL PRODUCTS (2010), http://www.fda.gov/BiologicsBloodVaccines/GuidanceCompliance

Regulatorylnformation/ProceduresSOPPs/ucm073468.htm
BLA).
Il l. Outterson, supranote 29, at 199.

(governing change in ownership of a
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follow describe how the information can be used.
A competitor could use the content directly in its own regulatory filings to
support approval of its competing products." 2 Professor Eisenberg has argued
that the concern about second entrants using released data to obtain approvals
of their own was effectively mooted by enactment of the Hatch-Waxman
amendments which effectively permit reliance on that data after statutory
exclusivities have expired." 3 She agrees in a footnote that released data can be
used in foreign jurisdictions, and I believe this risk should be highlighted in
today's global pharmaceutical economy. But the real concern is that where the
data is released and available, an abbreviated application may not be required
by the regulator.1 4 A full application can be submitted. This effects an end
run around regulatory exclusivity, which prohibits only approval, or sometimes
submission, of abbreviated applications. And even if a full application is not
accepted, a literature-based or hybrid application may be accepted, even in
Europe or the United States."15 Literature-based applications are theoretically
112. See, e.g., Webb v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 696 F.2d 101, 103 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
("If a manufacturer's competitor could obtain all the data in the manufacturer's NDA, it could utilize
them in its own NDA without incurring the time, labor, risk, and expense involved in developing them
independently.").
113. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345, 381 (2007).
114. See, e.g., Second Declaration of Nancy B. Sager at f 14-15, 17, Gov. Accountability
Project v. HHS, No. 07-01702 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 2009) ECF No.19.1 ("If FDA were to disclose the
information that the agency has withheld as confidential commercial information, a competitor could
use that in information to support its own new drug application ('NDA') without having to incur the
time and expense involved in developing the information itself.") (making this point long after
enactment of Hatch-Waxman and focusing on full applications). The same point can be made about
biologics applications, and, if anything, the risk is greater because the statute is drafted so loosely.
FDA interprets the PHSA requirement as only "data derived from nonclinical laboratory and clinical
studies which demonstrate that the manufactured product meets prescribed requirements of safety,
purity, and potency." 21 C.F.R. § 601.2(a). It does not require that the data be owned by the applicant
or that the applicant have a right of reference to it.
115. FDA approves literature-based drug applications under section 505(b)(2) of the FDCA.
Also, EU regulatory authorities have a record of approving-during the data exclusivity termmarketing authorization applications, including pioneer data obtained by the applicant under
transparency laws. For instance, in 2008, generic versions of clopidogrel were approved by the
German authorities during the data exclusivity period and on the basis (in large part) of data in the
public domain, including summary reviews obtained from the U.S. FDA under FOIA. Update: The
German Plavix Case: Loopholes in European Data Protection?,JONES DAY COMMENTARY (2008),
available at http://www.jonesday.com/files/Publication/16a3768f-10a5-4f6d-9525-5efal57bl54f/
Presentation/PublicationAttachment/3ba3blcO-57cl-4e57-b838-0629d789527a/Update%20German
%20Plavix.pdf; Duncan Curley & Marleen H.J. van den Horst, Patents and Regulatory Data
Exclusivity for Medicinal Products, in OVERLAPPING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 119, 123-24
(Neil Wilkof & Shamnad Basheer eds., 2012). The European Commission later issued a statement
opposing this practice, but the EMA retains flexibility with respect to so-called "mixed" applications
(partially bibliographic and partially based on the applicant's own data), and applications based
substantially on information released to the public are legally possible. Press Release, The Pharma
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possible in countries like Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India, and Japan. 11 6
Of particular concern, some of these countries issue Certificates of
Pharmaceutical Products (CPPs), which can be used in other countries as the
basis for marketing authorization, creating a domino effect."17 There is also a
risk that disclosure in one country would be taken in other countries to
terminate the exclusivity period." 8 In some jurisdictions, it may also be
possible to use this content to partially bolster approval of a product that is not
even claimed to be the same or similar. That is, a competitor might be able to
justify a fairly small data package for a new use of an already approved
Letter, European Commission, Health: Germany Receives Final Warning to Comply with EU Rules
on Well Established Medicinal Use (May 5, 2010), availableat http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_
IP-10-536 en.htm.
116. This assertion reflects the views ofregulatory lawyers in the jurisdictions in question, with
whom the author has worked in the past, regarding what their regulators are likely to accept in practice.
Literature-based applications are accepted in Australia for orphan drugs. See AUSTRALIAN GOV'T,
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND AGING, THERAPEUTIC GOODS ADMIN., LITERATURE-BASED SUBMISSIONS

(2003), available at http://www.tga.gov.aulindustry/pm-literature-based-submissions.htm. Brazilian
authorities may accept hybrid applications for subsequent entrant biologics pursuant to the individual
development pathway described in Resolution RDC No. 55/2010. Nonclinical, phase 1,and phase 11
data may be deleted, and although full reports are technically required for phase III, data from another
country might persuade the regulator to approve all indications on the basis of data with respect to only
one indication. ANVISA, Agency Collegiate Board Resolution-RDC No. 55 , 80-81 (December 16,
2010), available at http://portal.anvisa.gov.br/wps/wcm/connect/935aed0048bd2755a7cdaf9a6e94f0
dO/RegistroProdutosBiologicos Hemoterapicos_10102011_WEB.pdf'?MOD=AJPERES. Canadian
authorities have significant discretion with respect to the contents of new drug submissions and could
in theory rely (at least in part) on data that supported another company's product in another jurisdiction.
Chinese authorities have broad discretion when determining which data are required for the different
types of drug and biologic applications as well as the weight given to different types of data. Indian
regulatory authorities have the discretion to waive the requirement that new drug applications contain
clinical data if the data are available from other countries. E.g., CDSCO, DRAFT GUIDANCE ON
APPROVAL OF CLINICAL TRIALS & NEW DRUGS, at 27 (2011), availableat http://www.cdsco.nic.in/

Guidance for NewDrugApproval-23.07.201 I.pdf. It is possible this would be applied in practice to
include data relating to another company's product. In Japan, there is at least a question whether the
contents of released clinical trial reports would be deemed in the "public domain" and allow approval
of second entrants during the re-examination period that follows approval of new drugs. See Yakujih
[Pharmaceutical Affairs Law], Law No. 145 of 1960, art. 14 (Japan) translatedin PHARMACEUTICAL
AFFAIRS LAW OF JAPAN (ENGLISH EDITION) 9 (Yakugyo Jiho Co. ed. 1962).

117. For instance, Brazil issues CPPs, and parts of the Asia-Pacific region, the Middle East,
Africa, and Latin America accept CPPs. See generally WHO, CertificationScheme on the Quality of
PharmaceuticalProducts Moving in InternationalCommerce, Working document QAS/l0.374 (May

2010), available at http://www.who.int/medicines/areas/quality safety/regulation legislation/
certification/en/. Thus release of the clinical module in one country could lead to approval in Brazil
and in turn to approval in countries that participate in the CPP scheme.
118. For instance, Article 25A of the Australian Therapeutic Goods Act provides five years of
exclusivity for information relating to certain active components of new therapeutic goods, provided
that the information is "not available to the public." TherapeuticGoods Act 1989 (Cth) s 25 pt 3-2 div
2 (Austl.). If a clinical module is released to the general public by another regulator, Australian
authorities could take the position that the same information-submitted to Australia-was no longer
subject to data exclusivity in the country.
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medicine, by showing the regulator a robust data package that supported the
same use of a previously approved (but not identical) medicine in the same
class.
There is more at issue than just whether the raw data might be used to
support marketing authorizations. The clinical module also provides valuable
competitive intelligence. Well-run and efficient clinical development programs
are essential to successful drug development and marketing approval, and the
effective presentation of the resulting information is the key to timely
marketing approval. A competitor with access to the content that supported
approval would know exactly how much, and what sort of, data were required
to obtain a given regulatory objective-as well as how to design and run its
clinical development program, how to analyze the results, and how to present
and package its application. To be more concrete, the clinical study protocols
and rationales for study design decisions (as well as decisions which studies to
conduct and which not to conduct) reflect the marketing authorization holder's
investment, expertise, and experience, and they could simply be copied by the
competitor. The clinical module could also provide advance warning of, and
solutions to, design and execution challenges with the studies. Information
about how the marketing authorization holder documented and tracked clinical
information, and the responsibilities it maintained in-house or assigned to
vendors, is sensitive business strategy and can be copied or could inform
differing approaches in order to gain a competitive advantage. The company's
statistical methodologies, actual statistical analyses, and conclusions could be
cribbed. They may shed light on ways to address missing data or other
complications in data interpretations. Information about the marketing
authorization holder's meeting with regulators would tell the competitor what
to expect and how to handle it. The company's characterizations of and
conclusions concerning its data, which appear in the clinical study reports,
contain and reflect scientific judgments and regulatory strategy, all validated
by regulatory approval.
The notion that this information is highly valuable to a company's
competition should not be controversial.1 9 Nor is it speculative. Instead, it is
well documented that biopharmaceutical companies are deeply interested in
obtaining the information in the applications of their competitors. As early as
1976, lawyers at FDA complained to Congress "of being forced to fund

119. Professor Lemmens suggests that the industry's concerns about the competitive advantage
of the confidential information have been overstated because much of the information is available
anyway. See Lemmens, supra note 29, at 81. He focuses mainly on patent applications and
competitive intelligence, but these sources of information rarely overlap in any meaningful way with
the actual contents of clinical modules. Id.
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'industrial espionage' through the agency's FOIA procedures." 20 As late as
2013, the EMA disclosed that a substantial percentage of requests for clinical
modules under the European Transparency Regulation were filed by private
competitors rather than public interest groups.121 In nearly forty years, little has
changed. Not surprisingly, companies go to great lengths to ensure the
continuing confidentiality of their safety and efficacy data and information.
Of course, not all companies seek to keep this information confidential, or
to keep it confidential permanently. The value of the information and of its
continued secrecy can change over time. If a product is no longer a significant
source of revenue for a company, the benefit of maintaining secrecy-to
prevent others from piggybacking and marketing copycat products-may not
be worth the cost. Some companies may routinely disclose clinical study
reports, perhaps considering the resulting public goodwill a benefit to their
business, for reasons that are uniquely their own. Others may have calculated
that given their particular structure and business model, as well as international
commercial strategy (sequencing of applications and approvals around the
world as well as markets targeted), regulatory exclusivity or the patents in their
portfolio-or both-are sufficient to maintain an acceptable profit margin even
if competitors are able to piggy-back on their research. Smaller companies
might release information to stimulate capital investment. And sometimes
companies do not know that their data have been leaked or released, or do not
know in advance-for instance in countries with leaky regulators or regulators
that are not fully committed to procedural protections for trade secrets. In any
case, whatever their reasons, some companies release or acquiesce to the
release of their safety and efficacy information. The vast majority have
historically gone to great lengths to keep this material secret.

120. See Pharm. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Weinberger, 411 F. Supp. 576, 579 n.7 (D.D.C. 1976) (citing
Hearingson Appropriationsfor Fiscal Year 1977 (FDA) Before the Subcomm. on Agric. & Related
Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 94th Cong. 717-18 (1976) (discussion with Richard A.
Merrill, Asst. Gen. Counsel, FDA)); Business Record Exemption of the Freedom of Information Act:
Hearingsbefore the Gov't Info. & IndividualRights Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on Gov't Operations,

95th Cong. 69 (1977) (statement of Donald Kennedy, Comm'r, FDA) ("about 80 percent of the
Freedom of Information requests we receive are from business entities, private attorneys, and FOI
service companies who are requesting records on behalf of corporate clients"); see MILGRIM, supra
note 36, at § 12.03 ("[I]t has long been apparent that information placed in the hands of the government
is more apt to be sought for competitive use than any public purpose.").
121. Peter Doshi & Tom Jefferson, Research Letters: The First 2 Years of the European
Medicines Agency's Policy on Access to Documents: Secret No Longer, 173 JAMA INTERNAL MED.

380, 381-82 (2013) ("David Mackay, BVetMed, MSc, PhD, MRCVS, of the European Medicines
Agency, closely reviewed the manuscript for accuracy and provided many clarifications about the
EMA's policy."). This document suggests that roughly one-third of the requests were filed directly by
competitors. A substantial percentage of the requests filed by lawyers and consultants are likely filed
on behalf of competitors. Id.
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Because this information plays both an instructive role and a regulatory
role, it is possible to permit some use and prevent other use. To give a concrete
example, if the EMA released a company's clinical data over its objection, other
governments can still-and most probably will-preserve regulatory
exclusivities (i.e., decline to accept or approve abbreviated applications for the
period of time laid down in local law). They could also refuse applications
from competitors that include those data in support of their own products (full
applications) and otherwise maintain trade secret status for the corresponding
clinical module in their countries.' 22 The right to prevent competitors from
using that research in regulatory filings, to support their own market access with
their own products, is analytically distinct and can therefore be preserved.
Understanding the content as property (rather than trade secret)-and
understanding the right to exclude broadly-thus provides a solution to the
problem of operating in a multinational regulatory state. The property right
need not evaporate upon disclosure. 123
A robust reading of the right to exclude, combined with a full view of the
regulatory context for this content, helps to explain why this content should not
be perceived as a true public good. Conventional wisdom holds that nonexcludable and non-rival goods are "public goods." 24 More specifically, it
must be technically difficult to prevent others from using the good free of
charge, and the use of the good by one person must not detract from the ability
of another to use it. The discussion above shows, however, that it is legally and
technically possible for a regulator to decline to permit use of publicly available
information to support approval of a medicinal product.' 25 Safety and
effectiveness information is, in that sense, excludable. Moreover, a plausible
argument can be made that they are not non-rival. A second entrant's use of
122. See by way of analogy the decision of the D.D.C. in its Memorandum Opinion in ACLU
v. Dep't of State, 878 F. Supp.2d 215, 218 (D.D.C. 2012) (mem.) (allowing the Department of State
to redact, citing exemption 1, information that had already been placed in the public domain by
Wikileaks).
123. Professor Stedman wrote in 1962 that "[i]t is, indeed, a strange form of 'property' that
disappears when the information it embraces becomes public . . . ." John C. Stedman, Trade Secrets,
23 OHIO ST. L.J. 4, 21 (1962). 1 do not agree with Professor Stedman that this means trade secrets are
not property. Professor Milgrim, citing this article, refers to trade secrets as an evaporating or
disappearing property right. MILGRIM, supranote 88, at 2-23 n. 17. While this may be true as to some
trade secrets, at least with respect to the content at issue here, the fact that it is possible to prevent some
uses even after disclosure means that the right has not disappeared.
124. See generally Uwe E. Reinhardt, An Information InfrastructureFor the Pharmaceutical
Market, 23 HEALTH AFFAIRS 107, 110 (2004).
125. This is what happens under orphan drug exclusivity schemes. During the orphan
exclusivity term, any application for the same drug for the same use will be rejected, even if it relies
on publicly available information. See 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) ("[T]he Secretary may not approve
another application under section 355 . . . or issue another license under section 262 of title 42 for such
drug for such disease or condition . . . .").
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the information, for instance, to support its own competing product, directly
diminishes the value of the information to the person that created it. It is
correct, however, that one person's use of the module to support approval of
his own product does not exhaust the module, and that an infinite number of
subsequent entrants can use the module to support their products. In this sense,
multiple people can stand on the same spot at the same time. A positivist would
say that a grant of property rights can solve the public good problem,' 26 but a
more robust understanding of the right to exclude-combined with the natural
rights premise-may undermine the public good assumption in the first
instance. 27
D. Implications
1. Application of Takings Principles
The conclusion that this content is property leads principally to the
conclusion that the Fifth Amendment applies to government actions. The
Supreme Court's takings jurisprudence is muddled by distracting lines between
per se and regulatory takings, distinctions between intellectual and real
property, and debates over the merits of ad hoc balancing tests. It is easy to get
tied in knots over whether a government action fully takes a portion of property
or partially takes the entire property, i.e., over what actually has been taken.
Where the property right itself is prone to being misconstrued too narrowly, as
happens with respect to the content at issue here, the muddle impedes analysis.
A conventional approach would begin with Monsanto, which appears on
point because it related to disclosure of data-characterized by the Court as
trade secrets and, therefore, property-submitted to support regulatory
approval. This case leads to the correct conclusion that forcible disclosure
constitutes a taking. But Justice Blackmun's reading of the right to exclude is
too narrow for the content at issue here, and it leads to an incorrect conclusion
that disclosure (and taking) precludes any further Fifth Amendment arguments
about non-consensual use.
At issue in Monsanto were statutory provisions that authorized the EPA to
disclose health and safety data submitted in pesticide registration applications
and to use them for the benefit of subsequent applicants. Provisions dating to
126. See, e.g., Samuelson, Information as Property, supra note 80, at 371.
127. Some might respond that the excludability just described is a function of regulatory
structures and not an intrinsic feature of the information. See Mark A. Lemley, Property, Intellectual
Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1052 n.87 (2005) (making that point about

information in general). But the content in question here-case report forms, data that have been
manipulated and tabulated for a regulatory purpose, clinical study report narratives written for a
regulator-owes its existence to the regulatory structure; the two are not severable.
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1972 allowed an applicant to designate some of the data as "trade secret or
commercial or financial information." A separate provision prohibited the EPA
from publicly disclosing any data that in its judgment contained, or related to,
trade secret or commercial or financial information. Following a series of court
cases in the 1970s clarifying that the phrase "trade secrets" was as broad as the
Restatement and applied to health, safety, and environmental data, Congress
amended the statute in 1978 to permit disclosure of these data to qualified
requestors notwithstanding the freestanding prohibition, which remained
intact.128
Justice Blackmun, for the majority, wrote that the term "property" in the
Takings Clause has generally been used "to denote the group of rights inhering
in the citizen's relation to the physical thing, as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it."' 2 9 The right to exclude, he noted, is "generally one of the most
essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as
property."130 With respect to a trade secret, "the right to exclude others is
central to the very definition of the property interest."' ' Finally, "[o]nce the
data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed
to use those data [the other aspect of FIFRA at issue in the case], the holder of
the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data." 3 2 This led to a takings
analysis.
The problem lies in Justice Blackmun's comment that disclosure of the data
in question eviscerates the property interest. This outcome may have been
correct as to pesticide registration data, perhaps because qualified requestors
did not include foreign or multinational companies, or because of concurrent
amendments to the scheme that governed use in second entrant applications.
But it is not correct with respect to the safety and effectiveness information in
drug applications. Although black letter trade secret law holds that widespread
disclosure of a trade secret eliminates trade secret status, finding that disclosure
eliminates property status-where the information has both regulatory and
informational uses-is inconsistent with the full right to exclude and thus with
the property status of the content in the first instance. Understanding this
content as trade secret before understanding the content as property-as Justice
Blackmun did-leads to absurd results.13 3
128. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 993.
129. Id. at 1003 (quoting General Motors, 323 U.S. at 377-78).
130. Id. at 128.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Professor Bone, for instance, writes that "once someone learns information, there is no
way to erase that knowledge and therefore no means of excluding the person in fact." Bone, supra
note 57, at 254. Accordingly, he concludes, "exclusivity must have seemed oddly inappropriate." Id.
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Instead, Loretto provides a helpful launching point for beginning to think
through the taking.134 This case concerned a New York law requiring landlords
to permit cable companies to install cable facilities on their property. The cable
equipment in question used up a portion of Loretto's apartment building roof
and the side of her building. Justice Marshall, writing for the Court, found a
permanent physical occupation of Loretto's property-not an easement-and
concluded that this occupation "is a taking without regard to the public interests
that it may serve." 3 5 Justice Marshall purported to apply the Penn Central
balancing test,13 6 but "when the physical intrusion reaches the extreme form of
a permanent physical occupation," he wrote, the "character of the government
action" becomes dispositive.137 (In Monsanto, the interference with reasonable
investment-backed expectations became dispositive.) In one sense, full
disclosure of a clinical module-to the general public without attendant
constraints on the uses to which the data can be put-is analogous, because it
represents permanent and irrevocable destruction of the right to exclude.
Unlike Penn Central,but like Loretto, this is not a situation where the property
owner's use of its own property is regulated. The information may still be used,
but it must be shared.138
The Court in Loretto noted, however, that government occupation of land
destroys all rights in the bundle as to the portion of land occupied, i.e., "chops
through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand." 39 These concepts do not
apply comfortably to forcible information sharing, for the same reason that
And for this reason, "secrecy was the sine qua non of possession and thus of common law property
rights in information." Id. at 255. This may be true outside the regulatory context. But where the
content is created in order to overcome a multi-national barrier to market entry, secrecy is only part of
possession. Professor Stroud proposes a "hybrid property/relationship" theory of trade secrets that
would permit prospective exclusion where parties obtain a trade secret innocently through publication
(e.g., via the internet), so that the innovator can recoup its investment. See generally Stroud, supra
note 72. He argues mainly from the need to protect substantial investments and from modem
developments like the internet. Id. The conclusion seems right from a public policy perspective, and
the proposed approach to trade secrets is intriguing, although this article takes a different analytical
approach.
134. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
135. Id. at 426.
136. Penn Central involved the government imposing a restriction on the property owner's use
of his own property, which is not the case here. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York, 438 U.S.
104 (1978); see also Epstein, supra note 85, at 63. Here the Court identified three factors to be
considered when assessing whether a government action is a taking: (1) whether the government action
"interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations," (2) the economic impact of the
government's action on the property owner, and (3) the nature of the government action. Penn Cent.
Transp. Co. 438 U.S. at 124.
137. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. 438 U.S. at 123.

138. Cf Loretto, 458 U.S. at 430 (distinguishing between "a permanent physical occupation, a
physical invasion short of an occupation, and a regulation that merely restricts the use of property").
139. Id. at 435.
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some think information is a public good. Two can use the clinical module at
the same time. For this reason, Kaiser Aetna may be the most relevant
precedent.140 This case involved a marina that had been created by Kaiser
Aetna, at considerable expense, by dredging and filling Kuapa Pond and
connecting the pond to Maunalua Bay and through that bay to the ocean. The
federal government concluded that this action made the pond-now-marina
subject to the "navigational servitude" of the federal government and that the
general public now held a right of access. Justice Rehnquist agreed that the
dredged pond constituted "navigable waters" and that the Commerce Clause
permitted Congress to assure the public a free right of access as a result. But,
he noted, the takings question was separate.141 The Court did not apply the ad
hoc inquiry derived from Penn Central and used in Monsanto.14 2 Because the
government's action resulted in loss of "one of the most essential sticks in the
bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property"-the right to
exclude-the government's action amounted to a taking under the diminutionof-value reasoning of Justice Holmes's opinion in the coal mining case,
Pennsylvania Co. v. Mahon.143
In Mahon, Justice Holmes observed that when "[diminution of value]
reaches a certain magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise
of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the act."l44 The case involved
mining for coal underneath the land to which Mahon owned only surface rights,
with the Pennsylvania Coal Company owning rights to remove all coal below
the surface. A statute passed subsequent to the sale of surface rights to Mahon
forbade mining that would cause subsidence of structures used for human
habitation. The issue before the Court was the statute's destruction of the
company's property rights. Justice Holmes pointed out that "the right to coal
consists in the right to mine it" and that making it "commercially impracticable
to mine certain coal has very nearly the same effect for constitutional purposes
as appropriating or destroying it." 4 5 Further, "while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking." 4 6
This gave rise to "regulatory takings" doctrine. The statute in Mahon
eviscerated the property owner's ability to make profitable use of its property.

140. Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979).
141. Id at 172.
142. If one were inclined simply to apply the Penn Centralfactors, one could reason from either
Monsanto (interference with reasonable investment-backed expectations) or Kaiser Aetna (nature of
the government action, analogous to a physical invasion), either of which would be dispositive here.
143. 260 U.S. 393 (1922).
144. Id. at 413.
145. Id. at 414.
146. Id. at 415.
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Disclosure of drug application contents, when combined with an environment
that permits, or fails to prevent, use (including use by regulators), would
perhaps be analogous. Disclosure in an enviromnent that safeguards against
some use, however, might not be analogous. But the "diminution in value"
concept should still lead to the conclusion that a compensable taking had
occurred.
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council relies on Mahon to articulate a
similar principle.147 Lucas bought residential lots in 1986 on which he intended
to build single-family homes. The South Carolina legislature in 1988 enacted
a statute that had the direct effect of barring him from erecting habitable
structures on those parcels. Justice Scalia concluded that a regulation
eliminating all economically beneficial use of real property requires
compensation, unless the regulation makes explicit restrictions that were
inherent in the title itself. Indeed, he noted, quoting Sir Edward Coke, "what is
the land but the profits thereof?" 1 48 While the disclosure of a company's
clinical modules to its competitors does not prevent that company from
obtaining approval of its product or using the information in future research, it
does effectively remove its ability to license that content to third parties (i.e.,
eliminates a revenue stream) and substantially reduces, possibly eliminates
entirely, the profit it could have realized from the module in the first instance
(i.e., by creating competition at a fraction of the price).
As the Court wrote in 1960, the primary purpose of the Takings Clause is
"to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens
which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole."l 49
It seems axiomatic that if the public has a broader interest in the fruits of the
labor of the pharmaceutical industry, the public should bear the burden of
paying for the fruits in question (or generate its own). At the same time, a
robust understanding of the right to exclude with respect to property that has
multiple functions-regulatory as well as informational-shows that disclosure
is not the same thing as use. And this in turn leads to a conclusion that the
scope of the taking, and perhaps compensation, will vary with the nature of the
disclosure and with other aspects of the law. Disclosure to parties that may not
make competitive use of the information, for instance, or disclosure combined
with explicit rules precluding use in marketing applications and in the
regulatory process is meaningfully different from a Fifth Amendment
perspective from disclosure to all, or disclosure combined with silence about
subsequent use, ambiguous rules on use, or rules expressly permitting use. And
147. 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992).
148. See id. at 1017 (quoting I E. COKE, INSTITUTES, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Amend. Ed., 1812)).
149. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
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this leads to the public policy question.
2. Public Policy Should Shape the Taking and Ancillary Legal Reform
The most compelling argument for disclosure of the contents of clinical
modules in marketing applications is that the information might be used by
others in ways that would benefit the public health and that the owners
themselves either will not do so (lacking the incentive) or cannot do so (because
they lack the necessary information, e.g., for a meta-analyses of data from
multiple products). This leads to two public policy solutions: (a) incentives for
sponsors to perform research of this sort, individually or collectively, and (b)
limited release by regulators (i.e., of the information necessary, such as
protocols, case report forms, and statistical analyses) to third parties (e.g.,
nonprofit researchers) for the purposes in question (e.g., aggregation and metaanalysis), subject to just compensation.
The second solution, limited release to appropriate third parties with just
compensation, only partly responds to the "right to health" argument for
disclosure advanced by Professor Lemmens. Professor Lemmens argues for
free flow of this information among a larger array of stakeholders, including
private scientists (presumably competitors), patients, and prescribers, as a way
to promote evidence-based decision-making in healthcare.150 Making the
information available to private industry scientists is, however, not essential to
ensure a meaningful contribution to evidence-based medicine, and it collides
squarely with the most compelling argument against disclosure of the
information in question-the fact that competitors may use this information to
free-ride on the work of the first entrant. Making the information available to
patients and prescribers could also undermine the quality of dialogue between
physician and patient. Releasing all of the safety and effectiveness data and
information in approved applications, including the broader file as
supplemented over time, will prompt third parties-some with good intentions,
others with nefarious intentions-to collect, interpret, analyze, manipulate, and
republish the information and their own conclusions and recommendations. As
it stands now, a patient researching her symptoms or a medication that her
doctor has recommended is faced with a dizzying array of information sources,
many legitimate, but some not. These will proliferate, if the contents of
marketing applications become available.
Indeed, broader disclosure could have a deleterious effect on the role of
FDA in our public health system. Professor Laakmann suggests that nondisclosure undermines faith in the industry, approved medicines, regulators,

150. See Lemmens, supra note 29, at 89-91.
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and the regulatory process. 51 But at least in the United States, with its culture
of free speech, junk science, and patient empowerment through the internet, an
unfiltered information dump is more likely to have the opposite effect. FDA
derives a great deal of its perceived legitimacy and thus effectiveness from
playing a pivotal-and frequently premarket-role with respect to the safety,
and often effectiveness, of nearly twenty-five percent of the consumer
economy.' 52 Releasing the information wholesale will prompt third parties to
generate their own recommendations on the safe and effective use of approved
medications and their own views on safety issues-in essence, parallel systems
of warnings, precautions, and contraindications. The impact of parallel
systems-one official, others highly credible but differing, and others less
credible and careful but perhaps more accessible or compelling to lay personson physician and patient behavior, and the public health, should be explored.' 53
We have a profound interest in a strong centralized regulator with the ability to
make definitive judgments on safety, efficacy, and labeling of medicines and
the authority to enforce those judgments. A world of semi-persuasive wikilabeling would not serve the public interest.15 4
Nor would an official process of peer-reviewing FDA decisions further the
primary public policy goal identified by Professor Laakmann, that of restoring
confidence in the regulatory scheme. Post-hoc peer review of approval and
labeling decisions runs the same risk of suggesting the regulator's conclusions
are not, in fact, definitive or reliable. Moreover, when FDA decides that a
product is safe and effective, meaning that its benefits outweigh its risks when
used as the manufacturer proposes to label it, the agency is also making a policy
decision based in part on our collective level of risk tolerance. The agency is
accountable for its decisions through its Senate-confirmed executive as well as
151. Laakmann, supra note 4, at 326-27.
152. See FDA, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: STRATEGIC PLAN FOR REGULATORY SCIENCE (Jan. 16,
2013), available at http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/RegulatoryScience/ucm2680
95.htm ("In the U.S., FDA-regulated products account for about 25 cents of every dollar spent by
American consumers each year-products that touch the lives of every American every day.").
153. Further, if FDA's role and authority with respect to safety and effectiveness of medicines
are undermined, its effectiveness with respect to other public health functions (e.g., product recalls and
food safety) could also be undermined.
154. Moreover, federal agency approval and labeling decisions affect what can and cannot be
said about the products (and by whom), what will and will not be paid for (and by whom), and what
does and does not give rise to product liability. If these decisions are stripped of their certainty and
viewed by stakeholders (such as physicians, patients, medical licensure and standards organizations,
pharmacists and pharmacy boards, insurers, plaintiff lawyers, and prosecutors) instead as opinions,
these other bodies of law will be affected. Thus, as Professor Cahoy suggests, the impact of disclosure
on products liability theory must be examined. See Cahoy, supra note 29. To the extent that claims
are currently predicated on failure to alert physicians in the approved labeling of a particular safety
risk that was hidden in the confidential file, after disclosure one might easily argue those claims must
simply fail.
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through Congressional oversight. And the agency's decisions are driven by
precedent, policy, and consideration of collateral consequences. No academic
or non-profit organization performing peer review is similarly positioned to
consider precedent, public policy, and collateral consequences, nor is any
similarly accountable.
In any case, there is already a considerable amount of truthful and accurate
information in the public domain for physicians and patients about the clinical
trials performed on approved medicines. This includes the approved
labeling.' 5 5 It also includes the action package on the FDA website, which
includes detailed memoranda prepared by agency scientists who reviewed the
trials.' 56 And it includes the clinical study results database maintained by the
National Institutes of Health at www.clinicaltrials.gov.' 57 Biopharmaceutical
155. This labeling contains two sections describing the clinical research performed to support
approval. Section 12 describes clinical pharmacology studies, and section 14 describes the remaining
clinical studies. FDA regulations require the latter to discuss the studies that "facilitate an
understanding of how to use the drug safely and effectively." The description includes a "discussion
of study design, population, endpoints, and results." Also, if a specific study is mentioned anywhere
in the labeling because it is essential to understanding the information in that section, that study must
be discussed in section 14. Section 6 of the package insert describes "the overall adverse reaction
profile of the drug based on the entire safety database." Where adverse reactions have significant
clinical implications, the labeling includes details about "the nature, frequency, and severity of the
adverse reaction and the relationship of the adverse reaction to drug dose and demographic
characteristics, if those data are available and important." 21 C.F.R. §201.57(c)(7), (13), (15) (2013).
156. The action package includes documents generated by FDA related to review of the
application; documents pertaining to the format and content of the application generated during drug
development; labeling submitted by the applicant; a summary review that documents conclusions from
all reviewing disciplines about the drug; and the Division Director and Office Director's decision
document. 21 U.S.C. § 355(l) (2006). The materials generally include medical reviews, chemistry
reviews, pharmacology reviews, statistical reviews, and clinical pharmacology and biopharmaceutics
reviews. These documents describe the application in detail and explain the reviewing scientist's views
and conclusions. Many action packages include administrative documents and correspondence,
including memoranda from teleconferences, meeting minutes, letters responding to requests for
information from FDA, and other internal memoranda relating to FDA's review of the application.
The agency applies exemption 4 of FOIA before posting the material.
157. 42 U.S.C. §282(j)(2) (2006). This scheme applies to any controlled clinical investigation,
other than a phase I investigation, of a new drug. Among other things, the responsible party provides,
and NIH posts: (1) a table of the demographic and baseline characteristics of the patient sample, overall
and for each arm of the trial, including the number of patients who dropped out and the number of
patients excluded from the analysis; (2) primary and secondary outcome measures (as submitted to the
registry), and a table of values for each primary and secondary outcome measure for each arm of the
trial, including the results of scientifically appropriate tests of the statistical significance of the outcome
measures; (3) a table of anticipated and unanticipated serious adverse events grouped by organ system,
with number and frequency in each arm of the trial; and (4) a table of anticipated and unanticipated
adverse events not included in the serious adverse events table and that exceed a frequency of 5 percent
within any arm of the clinical trial, grouped by organ system, with number and frequency in each arm
of the trial. Enforcement is tied to federal funding and to acceptance and approval of regulatory
submissions. A further expansion through rulemaking, though authorized by statute, has not yet
happened. Id. at § 282. Eventually, the database will include summaries of the trial, and its results,
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companies and the external investigators they employ to conduct clinical trials
also discuss their research at scientific conferences and in scientific journals.
The major safety and efficacy trials relating to new medicines are almost always
presented at professional conferences and often published in peer-reviewed
medical journals.
Other policy arguments for broad disclosure of the contents of clinical
modules overlook less drastic means to accomplish their objectives. There is,
for instance, an argument that readily accessible information about study results
is inherently biased-because biopharmaceutical manufacturers decline to
release or publish the results of negative trials, or because the medical journals
prefer to publish positive trials. 158 The result, it is said, is that prescribers and
patients lack complete and unbiased information on which to make their
decisions.159 The question, however, is whether public release of the full data
and analysis for every trial for every approved drug is an effective way to solve
this issue, assuming the assertion is substantiated. A requirement to register
every trial and to post summaries of the results, understandable to healthcare
professionals and understandable to lay persons, would seem to solve most of
the problem. Federal law already imposes this requirement,' 60 and if the
summaries are not sufficiently robust to elucidate the negative aspects of the
trial results, the solution is to revise the requirements for the format, content,
and scope of the summaries. A requirement to report to the national regulatory
authority the result of every trial relevant to safety and effectiveness of the drug,
a requirement that product labeling not be misleading by virtue of omission of
material facts, and regulatory authority to mandate safety-related labeling
changes when warranted would seem to solve the rest of the problem. Again,
federal law already embraces these concepts.' 6 ' If there is a substantiated
concern that these requirements are flouted, or the regulator weak, the solution
for both patients and healthcare professionals (if the Secretary determines that they can be included
without being misleading or promotional) and either the full protocol, or the information about the
protocol to help to evaluate the trial results; and perhaps other appropriate information.
158. E.g., Lemmens, supra note 29, at 92-93 (citing studies that "indicate that industrysponsored trials are much more likely than other trials to conclude that drugs produced by the
sponsoring company are safe and effective"); Joanna K. Sax, Protecting Scientific Integrity: The
Commercial Speech Doctrine Applied to Industry Publications, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 203, 206-07

(2011) (arguing that industry manipulates the public through the publication of misleading studies and
citing reports that company-sponsored research is more likely than non-profit research to report
favorable results).
159. See also Eisenberg,supra note 113, at 382 ("Publicly available data would permit patients,
doctors, and insurers to make better choices of drugs.").
160. See supra note 157.
161. 42 U.S.C. § 282(j)(3), (4)(C) (relating to reporting clinical trial results), 21 U.S.C. § 321(n)
(relating to misleading labeling or advertising), 21 U.S.C. § 352(a) (relating to false or misleading
labeling), 21 U.S.C. § 355(o)(4) (relating to safety labeling changes).
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lies in strengthening its authority and enforcement capabilities-not in
implicitly undermining it with a parallel structure of medicine review.
If broad disclosure were instead required, public policy considerations
might compel parallel reform to other bodies of law. For instance,
biopharmaceutical manufacturers are subject to strict rules regarding what they
can and cannot say about their approved medications. FDA's regulatory regime
generally prohibits speech about approved prescription drugs outside the drug's
approved package insert, unless specifically exempted by the agency from its
requirements governing labeling, even if the speech is truthful, informative, and
fully consistent with the approved uses of the drug. To give a concrete
example: the agency routinely objects to companies providing information to
physicians about subgroup analyses that do not appear in the approved
physician labeling-such as information that the drug may work particularly
well in specific groups and not in others.' 62 To give another example, where a
company scientist speaks publicly about the company's approved drugs and
receives a question from the audience that calls for a response that is outside
the labeling, current agency guidance indicates the speaker must respond
privately and outside the public forum.' 63 If, however, the safety and
effectiveness data and information have been released publicly, it seems unfair,
arguably inconsistent with the premise for disclosure, and possibly contrary to
the public health, to preclude the entity that generated the data, information,
and analysis in question from engaging freely in the ensuing discussion.
Takings considerations inherently counsel for limited disclosure. Public
policy considerations similarly counsel for limited disclosure: to non-profit
scientific and academic researchers and institutions, for general medical
research that will benefit the public health-aggregation and meta-analyses of
work performed on a particular molecule by different companies, for instance,
or research to detect issues of safety and efficacy related to an entire class. Peer
review of approval and labeling decisions risks undermining the central role of
162. See, e.g., Letter from Marybeth Toscano, PharmD, Regulatory Review Officer, Division
of Professional Drug Promotion, Office of Prescription Drug Promotion, et al. to Alexandra Burtoft,
Associate Program Director, Commercial Regulatory Affairs, Genentech, Inc., (Oct. 3, 2012),
available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryinformation/
EnforcementActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceutical
Companies/UCM323628.pdf; Letter from Thomas W. Abrams, RPh, MBA, Director, Division of Drug
Marketing, Advertising, and Communications to Three Rivers Pharmaceuticals, LLC (Mar. 21, 2011),
available at http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatorylnformation/Enforcement
ActivitiesbyFDA/WarningLettersandNoticeofViolationLetterstoPharmaceuticalCompanies/ucm2592
49.htm.
163. FDA, GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY RESPONDING TO UNSOLICITED REQUESTS FOR OFFLABEL INFORMATION ABOUT PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AND MEDICAL DEVICES: DRAFT GUIDANCE, at

10-12 (2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatory
Information/Guidances/UCM285145.pdf.
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the regulator, and broader dissemination risks flooding physicians and patients
with alternative and non-credible analysis. Only the information necessary to
perform this research should be shared, which would protect a fair amount of
the narrative in clinical study reports. And the information should be shared
with enforceable confidentiality restrictions in place, with some care given to
ensure that the resulting conclusions and research can be published for
stakeholders. The other arguments for disclosure, and an approach of broader
(public) disclosure, seem insufficient to outweigh concerns about undermining
incentives to innovate. At the very least, if broad disclosure to the public is
implemented, manufacturers should be allowed to engage freely in discussion
about their products, and liability arguments that they have failed to disclose
safety information to patients should fail.
3. Just Compensation Follows
Limiting the taking to this disclosure and expressly precluding use by
competitors may reduce the compensation owed.16 Whether the disclosure is
broad or narrow, the U.S. government can limit the content's use by
competitors, by confirming that it will not rely on the released information to
support applications, nor use it to guide or advise applicants. It can honor rights
to reference and otherwise confirm that it views the contents of the applications
as private property with at least some strands of the property bundle intact.
Controlled disclosure with confidentiality agreements in place, regardless of
these ancillary non-use protections, might not even eliminate trade secret status
for purposes of conventional trade secret law.' 65 But it is clearly government
action stripping the property owner of some rights, and thus just compensation
is required.
Just compensation for the taking can be achieved through any of various
mechanisms, including establishment of panels to calculate the recovery, as
was done for the data in pesticide applications.' 66 Certain fundamental
164. Fla. Rock Indus. v. United States, 18 F.3d 1560, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ("Logically, the
amount of just compensation should be proportional to the value of the interest taken as compared to
the total value of the property . . . ."). But see Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1011-12 ("With respect to a
trade secret, the right to exclude others is central to the very definition of the property interest. Once
the data that constitute a trade secret are disclosed to others, or others are allowed to use those data,
the holder of the trade secret has lost his property interest in the data. That the data retain usefulness
for Monsanto even after they are disclosed ... is irrelevant to the determination of the economic impact
of the EPA action on Monsanto's property right. The economic value of that property right lies in the
competitive advantage over others that Monsanto enjoys by virtue of its exclusive access to the data,
and disclosure or use by others of the data would destroy that competitive edge.") (internal footnotes
omitted).
165. See CHISUM, supra note 82, at 200 n.5 ("Today, secrecy must only be 'relative,' or the
subject of efforts that are 'reasonable under the circumstances."') (citation omitted).
166. See Amendment to the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, § 2(a)(1), 92
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principles guide just compensation determinations, though these principles may
be tricky to apply in this setting. Just compensation seeks to compensate for
the owner's loss, not the taker's gain.' 6 7 The owner's loss is usually interpreted
as the fair market value of the property, meaning what a willing seller and a
willing buyer would agree to on an open market.168 But this property and this
taking have characteristics that present special challenges for the application of
these principles. First, this property is by its nature confidential, and there is
no open market or comparable piece of property to use as a reference for
determining its fair market value. Second, one would have to determine the
portion of the total value taken by the confidential disclosure to academic
researchers for purposes of general research. If the willing seller would release
this content to these entities for this purpose for a fairly minimal payment, then
that is just compensation. But that must be determined as to each property
owner. An alternative to compensation panels would be some sort of statutory
quidpro quo, such as patent term restoration or special exclusivity. If in fact
the value taken varies, however, a procrustean bed will not satisfy the Fifth
Amendment. The statutory quid pro quo will need to be flexible, or Fifth
Amendment considerations will require that companies have the option to seek
monetary compensation instead. Further, due process considerations may
dictate that a quid pro quo not be forced onto companies that have already
generated and submitted this content.
4. The International Dimension
Disclosure in a multi-national environment could moot the just
compensation question. A foreign regulator may take the first step, whether
releasing all of the content to the general public or releasing some of the content
to a smaller contingent. But the Takings Clause is grounded in the principle
that the government is not free to commandeer private property for public
Stat. 819, 820-22. The 1978 amendments to FIFRA removed responsibility for arbitrating disputes
over data compensation from EPA and delegated it instead to an arbitration service, whose decisions
would not be reviewable by any court except for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct.
167. United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222, 228 (1956); United States v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949)
(citing McGovern v. New York, 229 U.S. 363 (1913)); United States ex rel. T.V.A. v. Powelson, 319
U.S. 266 (1943)); see also 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01 [5] (J. Sackman ed., 3d ed. 2009);
David G. Oberdick, Comment, The Taking of Trade Secrets: What Constitutes Just Compensation?,
48 U. PITT. L. REV. 247, 247-48 (1986).
168. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377 (1946); Whitney Benefits, Inc. v.
United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 394, 407-08 (1989), corrected, 20 Cl. Ct. 324 (1990), affd, 926 F.2d 1169
(Fed. Cir. 1991); Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 Nw. U. L. REV. 677, 678, 682 (2005); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensationfor
Takings: How Much is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 725 (1993); NICHOLS, supra note 167, at

§ 12.01.

84

MARQ. INTELL. PROP.L. REV

[Vol. 18:1

purposes without paying just compensation. Where the same property resides
simultaneously in the hands of multiple governments, any of which could take
the property and effect a taking in all jurisdictions at the same time and for the
benefit of all jurisdictions, the principles behind the Fifth Amendment should
not permit the U.S. government to eschew cabining the impact on U.S. property
rights. Even where release is broad (e.g., outright disclosure in Europe over the
objection of the property owner), U.S. property law can accommodate
preservation of other sticks in the bundle, and the moral imperative of the Fifth
Amendment requires that it do so. FDA should decline to use the released data
for the benefit of second entrants. This is the final reason the trade secret label
leads to an absurd result. The suggestion that forced disclosure terminates all
property status-all sticks in the bundle of rights-makes no sense doctrinally
(unless one does not believe the content is property in the first instance), and it
is untenable from a policy perspective in a multi-jurisdictional regulatory
environment.'6 9
An alternative policy approach would be for the United States to implement
incentives for the industry to share the information with nonprofit researchers.
As noted earlier, industry has announced a voluntary cabined data-sharing
program.170 Implicit in this volunteerism, however, is the specter of broader
disclosure by a foreign regulator against whom takings claims are not tenable.
But the law has two ways to achieve socially beneficial use of privately owned
property where that socially beneficial use presents a negative risk/benefit
balance to the property's owner and will not be voluntarily undertaken: the law
of eminent domain, on the one hand, and the offering of an incentive that shifts
the property owner's risk/benefit balance, on the other hand. In the real
property context, the states and federal government offer a variety of incentives
to encourage the best and most socially beneficial use of land. The statutory
quidproquos mentioned earlier, patent term restoration and market exclusivity,
could be considered by the U.S. government as incentives to engage in this
volunteerism, or they could be offered in the spirit of compensation where the
EMA has moved first. The elegance of a truly voluntary approach with
incentives in place is that the resulting property reallocation would inherently
take into account the multinational impact of the disclosure.

169. As noted, however, one could also reach this result under trade secret law, because the
secrecy required is only that which isreasonable under the circumstances. Arguably testing data remain
sufficiently secret for misappropriation concepts to apply in the United States, where there has been
disclosure abroad limited to a specific class of entities (academics) for a specific purpose (additional
research).
170. See supra note 28.
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CONCLUSION
The public interest will be advanced by ensuring that the data and scientific
analyses supporting the conclusions that medicines are safe and effective are
shared on a confidential basis with nonprofit researchers for generalized
research in the public interest. Broader approaches (more information, more
recipients) present serious risks that are not justified by any increased public
health benefit. Public release would give competitors information to support
their products and guide their research and development strategiesgovernment-sanctioned "free-riding" that would imperil the privately-funded
research and development model. Peer review of individual approval and
labeling decisions may collide with our interest in a robust, respected, and final
decisions by a central medicines authority.
At the same time, the content is property. No matter how narrowly tailored
the disclosure or how robust or effective the confidentiality restrictions,
releasing this content constitutes a taking under U.S. law that requires just
compensation. But particularly when cabined in this fashion, it need not be
understood as inherently obliterating all property rights in the data. Ancillary
legal reforms (prevention of regulator use) will further limit the taking and
arguably the required compensation. In short, where it is possible for regulators
to disentangle disclosure from use and to disentangle indirect use from direct
use, the narrowest taking that achieves the public health goal should be effected.
To the extent that a compensable taking has occurred in the United States,
policymakers can consider statutory in kind compensation. If the disclosure
has been effected by a foreign regulator, policymakers can and should blunt the
impact in the United States by preserving the other strands in the property right
in the United States. As a policy matter, they can and should also consider
offering the same in kind compensation, to ensure that the impact on property
rights does not affect incentives to innovate.

